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Summary 
This thesis sets out to discuss how the gravity model is used to account for the presence of 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in world trade, and how different applications have consequences 
for policy analysis. This is discussed through the models use in in two independent studies 
trying to predict the effects of a trade integration agreement between the EU and US. I also 
run my own gravity regression using a unique dataset to further supplement the discussion.  
NTBs are complex measures which impact trade in other ways than standard ad-valorem 
tariffs. They can be argued to correct market failures (e.g. as sanitary measures or safety 
regulations), or function as protectionist tools (i.e. as substitutes and/or compliments for 
tariffs). Furthermore, NTBs are difficult to monitor and measure, much more so than tariffs. 
Therefore, NTBs pose a serious challenge for economic research, especially since it is a 
general consensus that the presence of NTBs has become more apparent in recent decades, as 
shown by e.g. World Bank (2012). 
I investigate how the gravity model of trade, the most common tool for estimating trade 
flows, is used to account for the presence of NTBs. In particular, I look at how the model is 
used differently in two comprehensive studies that both try to predict the effects of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment partnership (TTIP) – a trade agreement between the EU 
and US currently under negotiation. NTB reduction is an explicit goal of the agreement, 
which makes this an important part of both studies.  
The studies are performed by the Leibniz Institute for Economic Research (IFO) and the 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). They reach very different conclusions on the 
effects of TTIP, both regarding the magnitude of the effects and sometimes also the direction 
of the outcome. I find that they use the gravity equation in different ways in the two studies, 
and argue that this is one of the reasons for their divergent results. 
To further discuss the presence of NTBs, and to provide an alternative to the CEPR and IFO 
studies, I construct an independent dataset. I use data on tariffs, NTBs and regional trade 
agreements (RTAs), and run my own regressions based on a thorough discussion on both the 
theoretical and empirical aspects of the gravity model. My data confirms that NTBs are more 
important than tariffs (on average) and my regressions show that there are gains to be made 
from reducing both NTBs and tariffs, but that the success of TTIP, or any trade agreement for 
VI 
 
that matter, to a large extent will hinge on NTB reductions. In this respect my data confirm 
similar observations in both the CEPR and IFO study. The results also imply that the effects 
of trade agreements seem somewhat underestimated in the CEPR study. Furthermore, my 
results indicate that the method used by IFO is highly sensitive to which trade agreements’ 
that are included in their RTA dummy variable, as their method consists of simulating a TTIP 
scenario based on the average effect of existing trade agreements.  
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1 Introduction 
During the last few decades the world economy has become increasingly integrated, and an 
important aspect of so-called “Globalization” has been to successfully reduce economic 
frictions between nations. In spite of this there are few countries, industries or even products 
where free trade truly exists, and as tariff levels have decreased, a new challenge has 
emerged. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are complex measures which impact trade in other ways 
than standard ad-valorem
1
 tariffs. Ranging from technical regulations and sanitary measures 
to import quotas and border inspections, they can correct market failures or serve as tools of 
protectionism. According to the World Bank (2012), NTBs have been increasing in recent 
years, both in magnitude and multitude, and it is often argued that they serve as substitutes for 
tariffs (e.g. by Kee et al, 2009). Therefore, for anyone trying to remove trade frictions 
between nations, NTBs are a serious challenge. Furthermore, they pose a challenge to 
everyone wanting to measure and quantify them.  
Unlike tariffs, NTBs are not easily observed and there is no universal consensus on how they 
should be accounted for in empirical research. A tool which is frequently used is the gravity 
model of trade. If data is available the model can be used to estimate the effect of NTBs on 
trade flows, but it can also be used to transform data (e.g. from surveys) into ad-valorem tariff 
equivalents (as in e.g. Kee et al, 2009 and ECORYS, 2009a). 
I this thesis I discuss the use of gravity and how it is used in economic research to account for 
NTBs in an applied setting. In particular, I look at the case of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) – a trade integration agreement between the EU and US 
currently under negotiation. To reduce NTBs as well as tariffs is an explicit goal of the 
agreement (it is even pronounced on the TTIP homepage
2
). However, in spite of political will 
to get the agreement up and running on both sides of the Atlantic, NTB reduction is a 
complicated and sometimes delicate task. There is no guarantee of successful NTB removal. 
Therefore, there have been numerous studies trying to predict the results which look at 
various depths of the agreements’ ability to reduce frictions. In particular, there have been two 
major studies that have influenced the debate; one by the Leibniz Institute for Economic 
Research (IFO), the other by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Their results 
                                                 
1
 Ad-valorem is Latin for “according to the value”. Thus, tariffs are ad-valorem in the sense that they are 
proportional, i.e. an X % ad-valorem import tariff amounts to X % of the import value. 
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/ 
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are generally positive; TTIP will increase trade, GDP and welfare (IFO, 2013a; CEPR, 2013). 
But the studies vary tremendously in terms of both the magnitude of the impact, and 
sometimes also regarding the direction of the outcome. However, in both studies the gravity 
equation plays a pivotal role. In particular, both use the gravity model, in different ways, to 
incorporate the presence of NTBs into their models. Their different ways of using the gravity 
model can help to explain their divergent results. This makes the two studies the perfect 
backdrop for a discussion on how the gravity model can be used to account for the presence 
of NTBs, and how different ways of using the model have consequences for policy analysis. 
In its most simple form the gravity equation relates a country j's expenditure on goods from 
country i, i.e. i’s exports to j, to the countries sizes, often measured by GDP, and any trade 
frictions between them. This relation has proved to be one of the most empirically successful 
in economic literature, but until recently it has lacked a proper theoretical footing (Head and 
Mayer, 2014). One of the first successful attempts to derive a theoretical version of the model 
was Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The most important result emerging from their work 
is one that is intuitively appealing, but previously not formalized into the model; “… the more 
resistant to trade with all others a region is, the more it is pushed to trade with a given 
bilateral partner” (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003 pp. 170). In other words, trade frictions 
with all trade partners of both i and j affect their bilateral trade. Previous empirical versions of 
the gravity equation have failed to control for this, and have thus suffered from an omitted 
variable bias (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Anderson and van Wincoop named this 
concept “multilateral resistance” and nearly every theoretical gravity model since have 
integrated this concept one way or another (e.g. Bergstrand et al, 2013). Now, the model has a 
range of different theoretical microfoundations and has been shown to be very flexible to a 
wide range of specifications; e.g. the convergence with the heterogeneous firms literature (by 
Chaney (2008); Helpman et al. (2008); Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)). There have also been 
substantial developments regarding the econometric version of the model; with the use of 
fixed effects estimation (suggested by e.g. Feenstra, 2004), and the introduction of PPML 
estimation by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). This has made the gravity model the obvious choice 
for determining the impact of any variable on trade flows, which makes it a natural 
framework for measuring the effects of NTBs on trade.  
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The increased relevance of and focus on NTBs by policymakers and researchers, along with 
the recent developments of the gravity model and its use as a tool to predict the effects of 
TTIP motivates the following objective for my thesis: 
Investigate how the gravity model is used to account for the presence of NTBs in economic 
research, and in particular how it has been used to predict the outcome of TTIP. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the gravity model. The purpose 
is to establish a firm understanding of the model before going into a discussion about how it is 
used to account for the presence of NTBs. In chapter 3, I discuss the two studies on TTIP. I 
present their main results to demonstrate the divergence between them, before going into 
depth on their use of gravity and how they use the model to estimate the impact of NTBs. 
Chapter 4 contains my own estimations of the Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model. I 
use a comprehensive dataset on NTBs from the World Bank (constructed by Kee et al, 2009), 
which provides additional insight to the size of transatlantic as well as worldwide NTBs. 
Furthermore, my regressions provide an alternative to both the CEPR and the IFO studies and 
demonstrate the sensitivity of their methods. In addition to data on NTBs, I use data on 
existing trade agreements and discuss their ex-post effects on trade flows for both members 
and non-members of these agreements. Chapter 5 concludes. 
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2 The gravity equation of trade 
In this chapter I introduce the gravity model. The purpose is to formally introduce and discuss 
the model which is commonly used to measure the effects of NTBs on trade flows. I start with 
a brief discussion of the evolution of the model which has gone through a substantial 
evolvement over the last decades. However, it is not my intent to present every aspect of its 
evolution; I present a selective survey where I focus on what is most relevant for my thesis, 
namely the tools needed to discuss the effects of NTBs. In this regard, the introduction of so-
called multilateral resistance by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is important.  
First, I introduce a general version of the gravity model which is useful for capturing the 
modern concept of gravity in trade, before deriving the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
gravity model in its entirety. Their model is a crucial element in both studies on the TTIP 
agreement which will be discussed in the next chapter. I also include a brief discussion on the 
limitations of the model and the assumptions it makes. Next, I discuss some of the most 
common estimation techniques used in the literature. The discussion is limited to what is 
relevant for the estimations in chapter 4.  
2.1 The evolution of gravity in trade 
The gravity model of bilateral trade flows first made its appearance in the economic literature 
in the 1960s. It is the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen (1962) who is given credit for bringing 
the Newtonian law of universal gravitation from the late 1600s into the gravity literature (e.g. 
by Head and Mayer, 2014 and Feenstra, 2004). The Newtonian law of gravity stipulates that 
the gravitational force between two objects is proportional to the product of the two objects 
mass and inversely proportional to their distance. Analogous to this, the first gravity equation 
of international trade stipulated that trade between two countries is proportional to the product 
of the countries size and inversely proportional to the distance between them. Let     be 
bilateral trade (exports or imports),    and    denote the country size (often measured by 
GDP),     represent bilateral distance, and   be a constant: 
( 2.1 ) 
 
       
   
    
    
Equation (2.1) is the original gravity equation used by Tinbergen (1962). In light of the recent 
advancements within gravity research it is named the “Naïve” gravity equation by Head and 
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Mayer (2014).
 3
  The generalization that         is a feature added to the original 
Newtonian law of gravity which assumes that the coefficients equal unity. However, many 
studies have suggested that this might be the case for economic gravity as well. In a meta-
analysis, Head and Mayer (2014) find that average estimates are       ,       ,       , 
and that the unity coefficient often is included in the confidence intervals.
 4
 However, Silva 
and Tenreyro (2006) argue the “unity-consensus” is based upon a bias resulting from the use 
of OLS estimation with heteroskedastic data. This will be discussed in detail below. 
While the gravity equation of Tinbergen has been used by economists since the 1960s and 
was proved to be of high empirical relevance, it received opposition from the research 
community and stayed outside the mainstream of trade research until 1995 (Head and Mayer, 
2014). One of the reasons for this was the perception that the gravity equation was more an 
analogy of physics than a product of economic theory, despite an elaborate attempt by 
Anderson (1979) to provide a sound theoretical foundation. His model was deemed too 
complex, and did not catch on (Head and Mayer, 2014). But, while Anderson’s model did not 
push gravity into the limelight, it laid the groundwork for the Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) model which revolutionized the field.  
Head and Mayer (2014) divide the success of gravity, and its acceptance into the mainstream 
research community, into three stages, which will be elaborated in the three following 
subsections. 
2.1.1 Admission 
The turnaround came in 1995, when the conventional trade theories were the subject of 
discussion. Trefler (1995) criticized the standing literature’s empirical relevance, and in 
particular he claimed that the Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) theorem performs horribly. The H-O 
theorem states that a country will export the good which uses its relatively most abundant 
factor of production intensively, and import the good which uses its relatively scarce 
production factor intensively. In other words, factor endowments determine the trade flows in 
the H-O model. Trefler states that; “[f]actor endowments correctly predicts the direction of 
factor service trade about 50 percent of the time, a success rate that is matched by a coin toss” 
                                                 
3
 I have added the coefficient    to the last term of the naïve gravity equation as it is written in Head and 
Mayer (2014, eq. 4). This is to underline the point that since it is assumed that distance is the only trade friction 
the coefficient is assumed to be negative. 
4
 In 700, 671 and 1835 gravity studies respectively (Head and Mayer, 2014). 
6 
 
(Trefler, 1995 pp. 1029). He argues further that when a major theory within a field performs 
this badly, it should serve as an incentive to develop new theories. Also in 1995, Leamer and 
Levinsohn argued that gravity models have an impressively high success rate regarding its 
ability to explain international trade flows. They go on to criticize economists for not 
admitting distance into their way of thinking (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995).  
Another important contribution was Krugman (1995) who introduced the concept of 
“remoteness”. This was one of the first steps on the way towards the concept of multilateral 
resistance, which was popularized by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Remoteness 
measures a country’s average distance from all its trading partners, weighted by the partner 
countries share of world GDP. The idea is that bilateral trade relations between countries i and 
j are influenced by both countries’ other bilateral trade relations. Krugman elegantly 
illustrates his point with a thought experiment where the trading countries i and j are moved 
from the heart of Europe to Mars. Intuitively, he argues, this would affect their trade patterns. 
In the context of Trefler’s call for a new major theory of trade, Krugman’s thought 
experiment can be understood as an argument for the need to include general equilibrium 
effects into this theory. 
Another highly influential paper was McCallum (1995). He used the gravity equation to 
measure the effect of national borders on trade. He concludes that both national borders and 
bilateral distance are significant frictions to trade. This came at a time when the business press 
was claiming the “death of distance” and the “borderless world” as world trade became more 
integrated (Head and Mayer, 2014). In light of this, McCallum’s result was named the 
“Border puzzle” and his paper was an important demonstration of the explanatory power of 
the gravity equation. 
2.1.2 Structural gravity – the “revolution” of multilateral resistance 
Trefler’s call for a new major theory to explain trade flows, Leamer and Levinsohn’s focus on 
the high empirical relevance of gravity, and Krugman’s call for including general equilibrium 
effects resulted in the gravity model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The goal of their 
paper was twofold;  to create a sound theoretical framework for the gravity model, and  use 
this to solve the McCallum border puzzle. My focus will be on the former. The Anderson and 
van Wincoop model stipulates that trade between i and j is a function of (i) bilateral trade 
frictions between i and j, (ii) trade frictions between i and all its trade partners, and (iii) trade 
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frictions between j and all its trade partners (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Effects (ii) 
and (iii) are what they call “multilateral resistance”, which now has become a standard 
concept in gravity models. The surge of gravity models following Anderson and van Wincoop 
has become known as structural gravity equations.  
While Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) deserve to be credited for formalizing the concept 
of multilateral resistance, the concept precedes them. As mentioned above, Krugman’s 
thought experiment and his concept of remoteness reflects this. Furthermore, the necessity of 
controlling for multilateral effects is clearly stated by Polak (1996). He calls for including a 
term in the gravity equation which measures the “…total negative effect on the imports […] 
resulting from all the bilateral distances” (Polak, 1996 pp. 535). Controlling for this corrects 
an underestimation of trade flows in the gravity equation relative to observed values which 
was persistent in the literature, e.g. in Frankel et al. 1994a and 1994b (Polak, 1996). Polak 
states that the idea of including all bilateral distances is traced all the way back to Linnemann 
(1966). Linnemann created a ”location index” measuring each country’s average distance 
from its trading partners, as Krugman suggested, but he did not include this in his gravity 
equation.  
2.1.3 Convergence with the heterogeneous firms literature 
The gravity models’ final step towards inclusion in the field of international economics was 
the unification with the literature on heterogeneous production, i.e. where productivity is 
assumed to vary across firms (Head and Mayer, 2014). This concept was brought into the 
field of international economics by Melitz (2003). In 2008, three independent papers that 
expanded the gravity model in this direction were published; Chaney (2008), Helpman et al. 
(2008), and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). All these papers have in common that they allow for 
heterogeneous productivity on the supply side in the gravity model. Thus, these models were 
able to analyze the effects of trade shocks on the intensive and extensive production margins 
separately. For instance, an exogenous increase in trade costs leads to lower exports through 
two potential channels; (i) the least productive firms will be unable to produce, i.e. there will 
be a reduction in number of producers (extensive margin), and (ii) production is more 
expensive so each producing firm will produce (and export) less (intensive margin). As firm 
heterogeneity will not be a focal point of my thesis, I will not go far into this literature. 
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The introduction of multilateral resistance and the subsequent expansion of gravity to include 
firm heterogeneity shows how the gravity model has gone from being an empirical relation 
without a proper theoretical foundation, which met little respect in the mainstream economic 
literature, to become a model truly respected by theorists. The model now has a range of 
different theoretical microfoundations, and has been shown to be flexible to a wide range of 
specifications. In the next section, I go deeper into the formalities of the Anderson and van 
Wincoop gravity equation.  
2.2  Microfoundations 
Since the “revolution” of multilateral resistance a wide variety of theoretical 
microfoundations for the gravity model has been introduced. While my estimations are based 
on the Anderson and van Wincoop model, it is useful to start off at a more general level to 
demonstrate the flexibility and robustness of the gravity model across a wide range of 
different microeconomic assumptions and specifications.  
2.2.1 The Basic definition  
A general version of the modern gravity model can be written as in Head and Mayer (2014): 
( 2.2 ) 
 
              ,              
Where     is bilateral export from i to j
5
.    represents all “capabilities” of the exporter to all 
destinations while   captures all the characteristics of the import market in j. Note that the 
model is more general than the naïve version in the preceding subsection;    and    have been 
replaced by     and  , where all characteristics belonging to i and j are included.    and   
are multilateral terms as they are equal across all importers (exporters) for a given exporter 
(importer). The term     is now interpreted as bilateral accessibility of exporter i to importer j 
which now captures all concepts of friction in trade. This includes both natural frictions such 
as distance and geographical placement, and political frictions such as borders, tariffs and 
NTBs. The term   is a gravitational constant. If time subscripts were added, i.e. if the above 
equation is used in a panel data analysis,   would be allowed to vary over time.  
                                                 
5 In principle     can also be bilateral imports.  
9 
 
Two important features stand out from equation (2.2). First, note that each term enters 
multiplicatively. This particular functional form is consistent across all specifications of the 
gravity model. It is a feature which is rooted in the models historical analogy to the 
Newtonian law of gravity. In other words, the multiplicative form has occurred somewhat 
unintentionally and does not necessarily reflect any features of economic theory. 
Nevertheless, the functional form has some theoretical justifications. In particular, Anderson 
(1979) demonstrates that a multiplicative form follows from a Cobb Douglas model where 
products are differentiated by place of origin, and Helpman and Krugman (1985) show that 
the multiplicative form could be generated in a model with intra-industry trade only. 
However, it is possible that future work will make use of other functional forms, as argued by 
Head and Mayer (2014).  
The second, and most important feature in (2.2) is the fact that all third country effects must 
come through the multilateral terms    or  . To extrapolate this point, Head and Mayer 
expand the above definition of the gravity model: 
( 2.3 ) 
 
    
  
   ⏟
  
  
  ⏟
  
    
 
 
Equation (2.3) is called the Structural Gravity Equation. Here, country i’s value of 
production,    ∑     , is defined as the sum of its exports to all regions, and the value of 
country j’s expenditure,    ∑     , is defined as the sum of its imports across all exporters. 
In practice GDP is often used as a proxy for     and   . The terms   and   are the 
multilateral resistance terms which are defined as:  
( 2.4 ) 
 
   ∑
     
  
   and    ∑
     
  
  
 
  
The important feature of the multilateral resistance terms is that they include trade friction 
terms between all trading partners for both i and j. It is intuitively appealing that the friction 
between j and its other trading partners, i.e. all    , will affect its demand for goods from i. 
For example, if a bilateral trade agreement were initiated between importer j and some other 
country    , this would decrease trade costs between j and   relative to those between j and i. 
Hence, country j’s demand would shift towards   and away from i, and exports from country i 
to country j would decrease.  
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The structural gravity model, as described in equation (2.3) and (2.4) above, identifies the 
core features of modern gravity theory. It relates bilateral exports multiplicatively to bilateral 
trade frictions, the exporter’s value of production, importer’s value of expenditures, and 
controls for multilateral resistance. However, beyond this the model in (2.3) and (2.4) is of 
little use. To obtain a gravity equation to be used for estimation, a more elaborate theoretical 
framework is needed. As mentioned above there are many possible approaches. Both 
conditional- and unconditional general equilibrium frameworks can be used. In the next 
section, I derive the model based on the conditional general equilibrium framework from 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Their model is relevant for discussing both the IFO and 
CEPR studies on the TTIP agreement as both use extensions of this model to account for 
NTBs and tariffs. I will also briefly present alternative specifications such as the 
unconditional general equilibrium approach, based on monopolistic competition and 
increasing returns to scale in production, as in Bergstrand et al (2013).  
2.3 The Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model 
2.3.1 Assumptions 
There are two main underlying assumptions in the Anderson and van Wincoop model. The 
first assumption is that goods are differentiated by place of origin. This is the so called 
Armington assumption, after Armington (1969), who assumed that two goods of the same 
kind originating from different regions were imperfect substitutes. The Armington assumption 
implies trade separability. This means that the allocation of trade across countries is separable 
from the allocation of production and spending within countries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2004). This assumption ensures that the model is a conditional general equilibrium model 
where supply of and expenditure on goods can be taken as a given in the analysis of bilateral 
trade patterns (ECORYS, 2009b). A related assumption is that each country specializes in 
production of only one good and regards the supply of each good as fixed. Hence, their model 
does not include firm’s decisions. The second assumption is that consumers have identical 
and homothetic preferences
6
. This motivates the use of a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) utility function (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).  
                                                 
6
 I.e. described by a homothetic utility function, defined such that if the consumer is indifferent between   and 
  he is also indifferent between   and    for any    . The CES utility function is homothetic.  
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2.3.2 Deriving the gravity equation 
The CES utility function of consumers in country j is given by 
( 2.5 ) 
 
   [∑   
       
    
       
 
   
]
       
 
 
 
Where     is consumption of goods from i by consumers in j,   is the elasticity of substitution 
and N is the number of countries.    is an arbitrary parameter of preference towards goods 
from country i, which can be thought of as an inverse measure of quality. It might be more 
useful to consider        , where    can be thought of as the attractiveness of country i's 
good (Head and Mayer, 2014). This is more intuitively appealing and it would be a simple 
matter to replace    
       
 with   
       
 in equation (2.5). However, I continue with the 
above specification as this is the one used by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).  
The consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint: 
( 2.6 ) 
 
   ∑       
 
   
 
 
 
where     is the price on goods from i faced by consumers in j. Due to trade costs, the price of 
country i's goods differ depending on the importer j. Trade costs are modeled according to the 
“iceberg”-structure where it is assumed that a fraction     of the good “melts” away during 
transportation from i to j 7. How large this fraction is will depend on the individual 
characteristics of each bilateral relation. Formally, the price of i goods in j can be written as  
         , where     (     ) and    is the supply price of the firm in i. The nominal 
value of exports from i to j is then                    . Note that the trade cost term     is 
analogous to the accessibility term,   , from the previous section. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that total (nominal) income in country i is given by    ∑     , as was also discussed in the 
previous section. This assumption can be thought of as a market clearing condition. 
                                                 
7
 Anderson and van Wincoop use a slightly different specification of the trade costs in their 2003 paper. They 
assume that for each unit of the good shipped, the exporter incurs an export cost equal to        which is 
passed onto the importer. The qualitative and quantitative implications are the same. I use the iceberg analogy 
since this is a more common specification in the literature.     
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Combining the above assumptions with the budget constraint, we get the following Lagrange 
function for utility maximization with respect to      
( 2.7 ) 
 
  [∑   
       
    
       
 
   
]
       
  [∑         
 
   
   ] 
 
 
 
where   is the Lagrange Multiplier. Maximization yields the following first order condition: 
( 2.8 ) 
 
  
    
 [∑   
       
    
       
 
   
]
       
  
       
   
    
           
 
 
Along with the budget constraint this yields the following demand function (for full 
derivation see appendix A1): 
( 2.9 ) 
 
    
(       )
   
  
      
 
 
Where    [∑ (       )
    
   ]
       
 is the CES price index of country j. Note that a higher 
   implies a lower demand for i's product in j. This is consistent with the interpretation of    
as an inverse measure of quality. If I were to follow Head and Mayer (2014) the term   
    
would replace   
   
 in the numerator and demand would increase with    making the 
interpretation as a measure of attractiveness of i’s goods clear.  
Inserting (2.9) into the market clearing condition    ∑      and solving for       
    yield 
( 2.10 ) 
 
      
    
  
∑ (
   
  
)
   
  
 
   
 
 
 
Now, define world nominal GDP as    ∑   
 
   . Expanding the right hand side of equation 
(2.10) by                 , and inserting the resulting expression back into the demand 
equation (2.9) yields: 
( 2.11 ) 
 
    (
   
  
)
   
    
  
[∑(
   
  
)
   
  
  
 
   
]
  
 
 
 
Rearranging equation (2.11) yields the Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model: 
13 
 
( 2.12 ) 
 
    
    
  
(
   
    
)
   
 
 
 
Where   
    and   
    are multilateral resistance terms. They are defined as: 
( 2.13 ) 
 
  
    ∑(
   
  
)
   
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
( 2.14 )
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    ∑(
   
  
)
     
  
 
   
 
 
 
The Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model is groundbreaking in the sense that it was the 
first to formally incorporate the concept of multilateral resistance into the gravity model. 
Failure to control for multilateral resistance has been labeled the “gold medal mistake” of 
gravity research by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). According to Head and Mayer (2014), 
almost every paper preceding Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is awarded this gold medal. 
2.3.3 Trade costs 
Unfortunately, the trade cost term in (2.12) is not directly observable. Anderson and van 
Wincoop use the following proxy for trade costs: 
( 2.15 ) 
 
       
 
      
 
 
In (2.15)     is bilateral distance,     is a dummy variable that equals one if the two regions i 
and j are separated by a border. The particular proxies used by Anderson and van Wincoop 
are specific to their problem as they are trying to solve the “McCallum border puzzle”. I will 
not discuss the reasons for their exact specification, but it is useful to specify their trade cost 
function here as the functional form used is crucial for my own estimations in chapter 4. Their 
way of specifying the trade costs has become standard in the gravity literature (see e.g. Egger 
and Larch, 2011; Shepard, 2013 and Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). 
                                                 
8
 The expression in (2.14) is obtained by expanding the right hand side of equation (2.10) by        
         , inserting the resulting expression into the price index term    [∑ (       )
    
   ]
       
 and 
inserting for  
   .  
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2.3.4 Limitations of the Anderson and van Wincoop model 
Although the inclusion of multilateral resistance is a pivotal contribution in the field, the 
Anderson and van Wincoop model has its limitations. Many of these have been corrected for 
by others, and I will introduce some in the next subsection. But there are also some problems 
with the model where the literature is limited, and where there is scope for future research. 
An obvious problem with the model is that it analyzes trade at the aggregated level only. The 
assumption that each country produces only one good suppresses the fact that trade frictions 
affect different sectors differently. Anderson and van Wincoop admit to this limitation in their 
paper (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003 footnote 8).  
In light of the preceding literature on distance in trade, the success of Anderson and van 
Wincoop is to formally include the ideas of Polak (1996) and Krugman (1995) that distances 
to all trading partners matter. A next step would be to include the insight from the field of 
economic geography (as in e.g. Fujita et al, 1999). In this field the location of economic 
activity is assumed endogenous to the firms. Hence income becomes a function of 
geographical location as production is clustered spatially. In terms of the gravity equation 
(2.12) this would mean that GDP would be a function of distance. Research in this field is 
limited. 
Another issue with the model is the possible reversed causal relation between GDP and trade 
flows. High income will lead to more trade, but it is also quite clear that more trade can lead 
to higher income. This issue has to my knowledge not been sufficiently addressed in the 
gravity literature, even though it is well-established empirically (e.g by Irwin and Terviö, 
2002). 
2.3.5 Alternative specifications of the gravity equation 
Head and Mayer (2014) underline the flexibility of the structural gravity equation (2.3) in 
terms of the different microeconomic frameworks it can be adapted to.  
Demand side specifications  
Bergstrand et al. (2013) derive an alternative gravity equation based on a general equilibrium 
model where the supply side is modeled specifically and the assumption of trade separability 
is lifted. The model utilizes a Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman framework where consumer’s 
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preferences are determined by a “love for variety” and firms operate under monopolistic 
competition with increasing returns to scale (Bergstrand et al. 2013; Head and Mayer, 2014). 
This model is also relevant for the preceding discussion as it is used along with the Anderson 
and van Wincoop model in the ECORYS study on transatlantic non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter (ECORYS, 2009a).   
The main contribution of Bergstrand et al. (2013) is the development of a gravity model that 
allows for asymmetric trade costs and proper estimation of the elasticity of substitution. The 
elasticity of substitution is needed to conduct comparative statics analysis. Anderson and van 
Wincoop have to make an educated guess on the value of the elasticity of substitution based 
on previous estimations in their paper. Bergstrand et al. (2013) criticize this and show through 
various Monte Carlo exercises that this can lead to significant biases of the comparative 
statics results. I have included a formal derivation of the Bergstrand et al. (2013) gravity 
model in appendix A2. The model is not directly relevant as I will focus the Anderson and 
van Wincoop in the following chapters, but the framework is used by many (e.g. by Feenstra, 
2004). The derivation in the appendix also demonstrates that the fixed effects regression 
version of the Bergstrand et al. model similar to the Anderson and van Wincoop fixed effects 
regression model which I discuss below. 
Supply side specifications 
On the supply side, the most relevant derivations of the structural gravity model are the ones 
allowing for heterogeneity of firms’ productivity, as discussed above. This makes it is 
possible to analyze how trade costs affect the production structure. If a trade frictions increase 
marginal costs, trade will be reduced via the extensive margin, i.e. through reducing the 
production within each firm. If fixed costs are increased, trade will decrease as a result of 
fewer firms being able to produce. This kind of model is used in the paper by Egger and 
Larch (2011) which is used in the IFO study on the effects of the TTIP agreement.  
2.4 Gravity estimation 
Unfortunately, the multilateral resistance terms in (2.13) and (2.14) are not observable. This 
poses a problem for estimation. Another problem stems from the multiplicative nature of the 
gravity model. In this section I will discuss the reasons for, the consequences of and some of 
the solutions to these problems.  
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2.4.1 Estimation in Anderson and van Wincoop 
The pivotal role played by Anderson and van Wincoop in terms of their impact on the theory 
of gravity is not the case when it comes to estimation. To be able to solve the model in terms 
of observed variables, Anderson and van Wincoop make additional assumptions. Looking 
back at the general specification of the structural gravity model in (2.3) and (2.4), note that 
the model in (2.12) – (2.14) assumes that j’s expenditure,    ∑     , is equal to its nominal 
income   . In their paper they also assume symmetrical trade costs,         . Together, these 
assumptions imply      and make it possible to solve the equation system in (2.13) and 
(2.14) implicitly as a function of observables, i.e. GDPs and proxies for trade costs. Anderson 
and van Wincoop then suggest using nonlinear least squares estimation (NLS) for empirical 
estimation. The assumption of symmetrical trade cost is quite strong and has received 
criticism in the literature, e.g. by Bergstrand et al. (2013). Their model allows for 
asymmetrical trade costs. The use of NLS estimation has also been criticized (see Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006). 
2.4.2 Fixed effects OLS estimation 
A popular way to control for multilateral resistance, which does not require assuming 
symmetrical trade costs, is fixed effects estimation. By effectively creating a dummy variable 
for every exporter and importer included in the estimation, all country specific effects are 
taken into account. Formally, by taking the logs of equation (2.12) we get 
( 2.16 ) 
 
                                                            
where     is an added stochastic error term. By putting the terms together we can write this as: 
( 2.17 ) 
 
                              
( 2.18 ) 
 
          
( 2.19 ) 
 
                   
( 2.20 ) 
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Equation (2.17) is the standard gravity equation used for fixed effects estimation, where    
and    are the exporter and importer fixed effects, defined by (2.19 and (2.20). It captures all 
the information inherited in the multilateral resistance terms, and allows for OLS estimation. 
This is much less cumbersome than NLS estimation and has become very common in the 
literature (Head and Mayer, 2014). Note that since world GDP is constant across all country 
pairs it becomes the regression constant C.  
Unfortunately, fixed effects estimation does not come without limitations. All information in 
the single country dimension is inherited in the fixed effects of equation (2.19) and (2.20). 
This estimation method is therefore unable to single out any information on variables 
inherited in the fixed effects, i.e. any variables which are constant across all exporters 
(importers) for a given importer (exporter), such as GDP. Another weakness when using fixed 
effects estimation method with OLS compared to NLS is that zero-observations in trade 
matrices are discarded due to the fact that the natural logarithm of zero is undefined.  
2.4.3 Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimation  
Along with zero-observations, the problem of heteroskedasticity often occurs in trade data. 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) present an elegant and simple solution that fixes both these 
problems. They argue that the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator 
should be the workhorse estimator for gravity research, as it solves both these problems and 
can still be used with country fixed effects estimation.  
Heteroskedasticity 
Technically, the error term       in (2.16) is defined as           where     is the stochastic 
element in a regression version of equation (2.12): 
( 2.21 ) 
 
    
    
  
[
   
    
]
   
    
 
where the    ’s are assumed to be independently and identically distributed. Another 
important assumption for OLS consistency is that the error term does not depend on any of 
the regressors, i.e.  (                   )   (                     )   . In other words, the 
validity of the process of log-linearizing (2.21) depends critically on the assumption 
that      , and therefore also     , is independent of the regressors. However, when taking the 
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expected value of the natural logarithm of a random variable, like  (     ), the result will 
depend on both the mean and the higher moments of     (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). 
Therefore, if the dataset suffers from heteroskedasticity, i.e. the variance of     depends on 
one of the regressors, then  (                     )   , and the conditions for consistency 
of the OLS estimator is violated, which will lead to biased estimates. Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) argue that heteroskedasticity often is the case with trade data, and therefore suggest 
using a non-linear estimator, i.e. one which does not require log-linearization. 
Through thorough Monte Carlo experimentation, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that using 
log-linearization and OLS estimation achieves greatly biased estimates. They also test the 
PPML estimator against the OLS, NLS and Gamma Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimators. 
Four different specifications of heteroskedasticity are used during the tests. They conclude 
that the workhorse estimator for gravity models, and indeed any model with a constant-
elasticity framework, should be the PPML estimator. It outperforms the other estimators and 
is relatively more robust across a wide range of heteroskedastic specifications and 
measurement errors in the data (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Furthermore it is far less 
cumbersome in terms of calculation, as opposed to e.g. nonlinear least squares which is used 
by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). Based on this I use the PPML estimator for the 
estimations in chapter 4. 
Zero trade flows 
Since PPML is a nonlinear estimator it is also able to tackle the problem of zero trade flows in 
the dataset. As mentioned above, the gravity equation has its roots in the Newtonian Law of 
Gravity, which is a multiplicative formula. A problem with this analogy is that while 
gravitational force never can be zero (only infinitely small), zero trade flows are often 
observed. Thus, by log linearizing the gravity equation, we are effectively neglecting all zero 
trade flows and potentially creating a sample bias. Since the PPML estimator does not require 
use of the log of exports this bias is eliminated. 
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3 Studies on TTIP 
Before proceeding to estimation of the gravity model, I demonstrate how it is used differently 
in two comprehensive studies trying to predict the effects of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) – a trade integration agreement between the EU and US 
currently under negotiation. The first study is performed by the Leibniz Institute for 
Economic Research at the University of Munich (IFO), and was completed in January 2013 
on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. Although the 
primary concern is effects of TTIP on the German economy, the study also examines the 
effects on the rest of the EU and the US as well as the rest of the world. The second study is 
performed by Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) for the European Commission, 
and was published in March 2013. 
In both studies the gravity equation plays a key role. However, their conclusions are quite 
different, both in terms of the magnitude of the effects and sometimes also regarding the 
direction of the outcome. The latter case is especially true for the effects on TTIP’s non-
members. This has to do with the methods used. In particular, the two studies differ in how 
the gravity equation is utilized and how they account for the presence of NTBs. Both studies 
agree that NTBs will be the biggest challenge for the TTIP agreement, and they have very 
different ways of implementing this in their models. My goal in this chapter is to demonstrate 
how these underlying methodological differences can explain the divergent results. I first 
present and compare some of the main results of the studies, then I briefly discuss the overall 
approach before going into an in-depth discussion of the use of gravity modelling in each 
study. 
3.1 Main results 
As mentioned above, the studies are done separately and with different objectives. The CEPR 
study has a broader perspective and includes effects on trade in services and investments in 
addition to goods trade. It also includes environmental and sustainability impacts. The IFO 
study considers trade in goods only. Therefore, since my goal is to compare the studies, I only 
focus on the results regarding trade in goods in the CEPR study.  Furthermore, since the 
overall focus is on the gravity equation and how it is used differently in the two studies, I only 
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discuss results on GDP and trade flows as these are more directly linked to the use of the 
gravity model. 
3.1.1 Scenarios 
Both studies look at different scenarios where the TTIP agreement is more or less effective at 
reducing trade barriers. The scenarios are summarized in table 3.1. The IFO study has two 
scenarios; a limited scenario where tariffs are eliminated and a comprehensive scenario where 
NTBs are reduced as well. CEPR follow the same pattern, but they also distinguish between a 
less ambitious and an ambitious comprehensive scenario. Although the scenarios differ 
somewhat, the basic idea is the same in the two studies: a limited scenario mimicking an 
agreement that only covers tariffs and a deeper one which successfully eliminates NTBs as 
well. As pointed out earlier, both studies agree that NTB removal is crucial for the success of 
the agreement, and the results confirm this in both studies. One of the reasons that CEPR 
looks at different levels of NTB reductions while IFO does not is that IFO’s methodology 
restricts them in this area. They are also unable to be explicit about the percentage reduction. I 
get back to the reasons for this below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  IFO    CEPR 
Limited scenario 
  
Tariffs eliminated 
    
98% tariff reduction 
Comprehensive 
scenario(s) 
 
 
Both tariffs and NTBs  
reduced 
   Less ambitious 
     
98 % tariff reduction 
10% NTB reduction on goods 
 
    Ambitious 
     
100 % tariff reduction 
25% NTB reduction on goods 
 
  Sources: CEPR 2013, table 4 and IFO 2013b, pp. 6-8 
Table 3.1 TTIP scenarios in CEPR and IFO 
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3.1.2 GDP results 
Table 3.2 summarizes the predicted GDP effects in the two studies. Overall, the directions of 
the effects are similar. In the limited scenario, IFO estimates that GDP will increase by 0.75 
percent for the US and 0.24 percent for Germany. Unfortunately, they do not report an EU 
average. The average effect on TTIP members in the IFO study is positive, but they stress that 
the degree of heterogeneity is high, and that it will lead to negative effects for some member 
countries. Although they do not report an average for the rest of the world, they also report 
that GDP will decrease for countries that are attached to the EU and US through existing trade 
agreements, e.g. NAFTA and the EEA (IFO 2013b). CEPR predict that tariff elimination 
(limited scenario) will have positive GDP effects for EU countries as well as the US. Their 
estimated GDP effect is much lower than the IFO estimates. They also report an expected 
0.01 percent decrease in the rest of the world’s GDP. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The comprehensive scenarios are more interesting. There are two particular points that stand 
out. First, the GDP effects on EU and USA are much larger in the IFO study compared to the 
CEPR. For the US the estimated GDP increase is 13.38 percent, almost 13 percentage points 
higher (i.e. 34 times) than the most optimistic scenario in CEPR. Second, the IFO study 
 
  IFO    CEPR 
Limited scenario 
   
US: 0.75% 
Germany: 0.24% 
(EU avg. not reported) 
 
Row.: not reported  
 
    
EU: 0.1% 
US: 0.04% 
Row.: -0.01% 
 
Comprehensive 
scenario(s) 
 
EU: 4.95%  
US: 13.38%  
Row.: decrease  
   Less ambitious 
     
EU: 0.27%  
US: 0.21%  
Row: 0.07%  
 
    Ambitious 
     
EU: 0.48%  
US: 0.39%  
Row: 0.14%  
 
  Sources: CEPR 2013: table 6 , 16 and 41.  
                IFO 2013b, figure 4  and 5. 
                Medin and Melchior 2013 
Table 3.2 GDP effects in IFO and CEPR 
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predicts a decrease in GDP for the rest of the world, while CEPR expects an increase. One 
reason for this is that CEPR includes what they call spillover effects for third countries.  
If TTIP is successful in reducing NTBs as well as tariffs, it is important to consider these 
spillover effects since, contrary to tariffs, NTBs are not discriminatory by nature. When two 
countries agree on lower tariffs, third countries are automatically faced with higher tariffs and 
are therefore discriminated against. On the other hand, if the two countries agree on e.g. a new 
hygiene standard on import on certain agricultural goods, it is less likely that they are able to 
discriminate against third countries in the same way. This is the motivation for CEPR to 
include the spillover effects. It also serves an example of how NTBs work differently than 
tariffs. 
CEPR distinguish between two types of such spillover effects. Countries exporting to the EU 
and the US will to some extent benefit from the improved regulatory conditions negotiated in 
the agreement. This will grant third countries easier access to both the EU and US markets, 
instead of having to adjust their products differently for the two markets. This is what they 
call the direct spillover effect as it involves a direct cut in trade costs for countries exporting 
to both the EU and US (CEPR, 2013). Also, since the TTIP trading block would be very large 
in terms of trade volume, it is likely that third countries will get incentives to adapt to the 
same harmonization of product standards and regulations as TTIP. A global convergence 
toward common regulations is called the indirect spillover effect (CEPR, 2013). IFO does not 
include these spillover effects, which might contribute to explaining why the results for third 
countries are negative (and sometimes large in magnitude) in their study. 
In addition to the estimates in table 3.2, the CEPR study includes a breakdown of the 
estimates. They report that (in the ambitious case) 54 percent of the EU GDP increase is due 
to NTB reductions, and that 22 percent is from tariff reduction. For the US, only 10 percent of 
the increase is due to tariff elimination, and 59 percent comes from NTB reduction.
 9
 This 
again highlights the importance of NTB reduction for any trade agreement. The pattern of 
larger effects due to NTBs relative to tariffs occurs in nearly all their results and will not be 
stated for the remainder of the chapter.
 
 
                                                 
9
 The remaining increases come from the direct and indirect spillover effects, reduction in NTBs on services and 
procurement. I have chosen not to report these here to save space. The full effects can be found in CEPR 2013, 
chapter 5. 
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3.1.3 Trade flow results 
Table 3.3 shows the average effects on trade flows in the two studies. Note that the IFO study 
only shows effects on exports while CEPR shows effects on both imports and exports. Also, 
CEPR does not include trade flow effects for the rest of the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with the GDP estimates, the IFO study predicts much larger effects on trade than CEPR. It 
estimates that exports within TTIP will increase by an astonishing 92.8 percent in the 
comprehensive scenario. In contrast, the most ambitious scenario in the CEPR study shows an 
increase of 5.9 and 8 percent increases in exports for the EU and the US respectively. In this 
area, the CEPR study seems somewhat conservative. In a meta-analysis performed by Head 
and Mayer (2014) based on 257 independent gravity studies they find that the average 
increase in trade flows between fellow members of a trade agreement is 59 percent higher 
relative to trade between countries that are not in a trade agreement. My own estimations in 
the next chapter confirm this finding. 
 
 
  IFO  CEPR 
  Exports  Imports Exports 
Limited scenario 
   
Within TTIP: 5.8 % 
 
Between  
non-members: -0.5% 
 
 
EU: 1%  
US: 1.13% 
EU: 1.18% 
US: 1.91 
Comprehensive 
scenario(s) 
 
 
Within TTIP: 
92.8% 
 
Between TTIP members and 
non-members:  
78.8 % 
 
Between non-members:  
3.4 % 
 
 Less ambitious 
  
EU: 2,91% 
US: 3.81% 
EU: 3,37% 
US: 4.75% 
  Ambitious 
  
EU: 5.11% 
US: 4.74 
EU: 5.91% 
US: 8,02 % 
Sources: CEPR 2013: table 20 and table 21 
                IFO 2013a: table II.4 
                IFO 2013b, pp. 7  
Table 3.3 Trade flow effects in IFO and CEPR 
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3.1.4 Note on sector level results 
So far only aggregated effects are presented, but both studies include predictions on 
disaggregated levels. An in-depth discussion of differences and similarities between the 
studies on sector level is beyond the scope of my thesis. However, there are a few points 
worth mentioning regarding the sector level results in the two studies.  
From the CEPR study it seems that industrial and manufacturing goods will experience the 
biggest trade flow increase between the EU and US. The US motor vehicle exports to the EU 
is expected to be the winner. Also, CEPR estimate large increases in processed foods and 
chemical trade within TTIP. Interestingly, the results show that for many sectors exports will 
increase in both countries, i.e. we will likely see an increase in intra-industry trade as a result 
of the agreement according to CEPR. This is in line with the “new trade theory” pioneered by 
Krugman (1980). 
Contrary to CEPR, the IFO study concludes that it is the agricultural sector that will 
experience the largest trade increase, albeit from a very low level. They also expect large 
increases for the industrial sector.  
3.1.5 Discussion of the main results 
The most striking difference between the two studies is the magnitude of the predicted effects 
of TTIP. Throughout, the IFO study predicts larger effects, often many times that of CEPR. I 
argue that there is little chance that both studies are “correct”. By this I mean that it is 
unlikely that the results would converge, due to the law of large numbers, if the studies were 
repeated again and again, while the methods were left unchanged. On the contrary, it is my 
opinion that there are fundamental methodical differences between the two studies, and that 
this is the cause of the divergent results. At the very least this serves as motivation to dig into 
the underlying methodologies, which is the goal in the next two sections. However, an in-
depth discussion of the entire model framework in both studies is beyond the scope of my 
thesis. Therefore, the discussion is limited to their implementation of NTBs through gravity 
models.  
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3.2 IFO methodology 
The IFO methodology involves comparative statics analysis of gravity estimations, based on 
Egger and Larch
10
 (2011). They compare a factual base scenario with a counter-factual 
scenario where the TTIP agreement is simulated based on an estimated average effect of 
existing trade agreements. The average effect is obtained by running a gravity estimation 
using a bilateral dummy variable for existing agreements. An advantage when using this 
method is that it does not require explicit data on NTBs and tariffs, as all trade barrier 
reductions are argued to be accounted for by the RTA dummy. Thus, the problem of NTB 
measurement is overcome. Further, IFO relies on the insight from Egger et al. (2011), where 
they account for the possible endogeneity of trade agreements in the gravity model. To 
elaborate on the methodology, each of these papers is discussed in turn in the following 
subsections. 
3.2.1 Comparative statics in Egger and Larch (2011) 
The core methodology used by IFO is based on Egger and Larch 2011. In this paper the 
authors give an assessment of the effects of the “Europe agreement” between the EU and 10 
central and eastern European countries in the 1990s. The goal of the paper is to study the ex-
post effects of the agreement. However, the methodology can also be used to predict ex-ante 
effects of potential trade agreements, which is what they do in the IFO study.  
The basic idea in Egger and Larch (2011) is to run two separate gravity estimations and 
compare them. In the first case they estimate a factual base scenario where they include all 
relevant variables for gravity estimation. In the paper this includes a bilateral dummy variable 
for membership in the Europe agreement. In the second case, they construct a counterfactual 
scenario where the relevant policy variables are changed. Egger and Larch (2011) set the 
Europe agreement variable to zero for all observations. To get the trade effect of the 
agreement they compare the base scenario to the counterfactual scenario, i.e. the estimated 
base scenario trade flows minus the counterfactual scenario trade flows relative to the 
counterfactual trade flows in percent.  
To further clarify this methodology, consider again the Anderson and van Wincoop gravity 
equation: 
                                                 
10
 Mario Larch is one of the writers of the IFO study. 
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As the GDP terms are moved to the left hand side, the equation now measures GDP-
normalized aggregate exports from i to j which I refer to as    . Equation (3.1) is similar to 
equation (8) in Egger and Larch (2011). The main difference is that I have dropped the 
indicator variable that distinguishes between firms ability to produce given the current costs, 
i.e. the assumption of heterogeneous firm productivity is relaxed. This is done for simplicity 
and since it does not change the understanding of the methodology. Nonetheless, I wish to 
stress that the inclusion of firm heterogeneity adds strength to the IFO method as it allows 
them to analyze the effects of trade agreements on the extensive and intensive production 
margins. This is not taken into account in the gravity model used by CEPR.  
Let the subscript c denote the counterfactual scenario where the relevant policy variable is 
altered, i.e where the Europe Agreement dummy variable inherited in the trade costs     is set 
to zero for all observations. Then, following the logic described above, the percentage change 
in trade flows due to the Europe Agreement,     , is given by 
( 3.2 ) 
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Similarly their model defines the GDP of country i as      
       
  
    which leads them to 
the following expression for percentage change in nominal GDP 
( 3.3 ) 
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where          and    ∑   
 
    is world GDP with N countries. To save space I will not 
include the formal derivation of equation (3.3) and the expression for GDP as this requires a 
deeper examination of their model. My main point here is to show how they obtain their 
estimates of the effect of policy changes by comparing a counterfactual and a base scenario. 
The comparative static principle from Egger and Larch make up the core method for 
calculating GDP and trade flow effects of TTIP in the IFO study. Clearly, the gravity equation 
plays a pivotal role for their results.  
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3.2.2 Endogeneity and firm heterogeneity in Egger et al. (2011) 
In addition to the paper by Egger and Larch, IFO also relies on the insight from Egger et al. 
(2011) (IFO 2013b). The aim of this paper is to provide a better empirical gravity model that 
brings together three important issues in the literature; controlling for multilateral resistance, 
zero-observations in trade matrices, and the endogeneity of trade agreements. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, fixed effects and PPML estimation can be used to account for the two 
first issues.  
Endogeneity 
The last issue of controlling for endogeneity of trade agreements is, in my opinion, the biggest 
contribution of Egger et al. (2011). Furthermore, it is an advantage to the IFO method 
compared to that of CEPR. Intuitively, trade agreements lead to higher trade flows between 
members, but countries that trade more are also more likely to engage in trade agreements. 
This reverse causality calls for instrument variables to be used to avoid biased estimates.  
Finding instruments is challenging. They need to satisfy the requirements of relevance and 
validity, i.e. they need to be significantly correlated with the probability
11
 of forming trade 
agreements (relevance), but they cannot have any effect on exports other than through trade 
agreements (validity).
 
Egger et al. (2011) propose three instruments; (i) a dummy variable 
indicating whether there ever was a colonial relationship between the two counties in 
question, (ii) a dummy variable indicating whether they ever had the same colonizer and (iii) 
a dummy variable indicating whether they ever were the same country. These variables are 
elsewhere commonly used in gravity equations to control for historical and cultural factors, 
but they have not been used as instruments prior to Egger et al. (2011). To test the relevance 
of the instruments they perform an F-test in the first stage estimation on the joint null 
hypothesis that all the coefficients on the instruments are equal to zero. The null hypothesis is 
strongly rejected (Egger et al. 2011).  
The instruments validity is harder to prove. They perform two tests to argue for validity. In 
the first test they include the instruments in the second stage regression and perform an F-test 
like the one above. In this case the p-value is 0.48 (Egger et al. 2011). Hence, they cannot 
reject the null hypothesis at any conventional level of confidence. In the second test they 
                                                 
11
 As trade agreements enter the model as a dummy variable, Egger et al. (2011) use a probit model in the first 
stage regression. Hence, the correct interpretation of the first stage coefficients is their ability to influence the 
probability of forming a bilateral trade agreement.  
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perform a test on the overidentifying restrictions using a log-linearized model which restricts 
them to positive trade-flow values. Here as well, the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected as the 
p-value equals 0.48 also in this case (Egger et al. 2011). 
It is important to stress that the above tests cannot be taken as proof of instrument validity. 
They are to be taken as validity arguments only. In other words, the validity of the 
instruments can still be questioned. There is reason to believe that whether two countries have 
had a colonial relation, have had the same colonizer or have ever been the same country can 
affect the bilateral exports other than through the probability of forming a trade agreement. 
Consider for instance the bilateral relation between Britain and India, who have a previous 
colonial relationship. One of the reasons for Britain colonizing India was to control India’s 
resources. After India’s independence in 1947, it is likely that there still was a demand for 
Indian goods in Britain (and vice versa), and that this demand has been influenced by the 
economic ties resulting from years of colonial rule over India. This could lead to a larger trade 
flow between India and Britain than what would have been the case had Britain not colonized 
India, even though the countries have never been in a trade agreement. Thus, there is arguably 
a potential link between bilateral exports and the dummy variable indicating colonial relations 
other than through trade agreements. This example illustrates the problems with and 
importance of finding good instruments for trade agreements. 
Nonetheless, when controlling for endogeneity of trade agreements using the instruments 
above Egger et al. (2011) find that the estimates of the coefficient on trade agreements 
increase relative to the estimates when trade agreements are regarded as exogenous. This 
leads them to conclude that failure to regard trade agreements as endogenous biases the 
estimates downwards. This implies that the unobservable factors determining the creation of 
trade agreements come along with unobservable factors that on average have negative effects 
on trade flows (Egger et al. 2011). This can explain why the estimated trade flow effect of 
TTIP is higher in the IFO study than what is normally observed in the literature (e.g in the 
meta-analysis by Head and Mayer, 2014). However, it is important to stress that the 
legitimacy of this result hinges critically on the somewhat shaky validity arguments. 
Firm heterogeneity 
Egger et al. (2011) also make a distinction between the extensive and intensive margins of 
firm’s production. After controlling for endogeneity, they find that membership in a trade 
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agreement has a significant impact on the intensive margin, but not the extensive. This 
implies that trade agreements are effective at reducing marginal costs of trade, such that 
exporting firms will produce and export more (intensive margin). On the other hand, trade 
agreements seem to have little effect lowering fixed costs which would have increased the 
number of exporting firms (extensive margin). This is an important result as it shows that 
entry into a transatlantic trade agreement might alter the industrial organization of a country. 
Yet again, this also underlines the importance of NTB reduction in trade agreements. 
Although NTBs come in a variety of forms it is natural to expect that they in principle can be 
considered non-proportional, i.e. fixed (IFO 2013, Medin, 2014). Tariffs, on the other hand, 
are proportional by definition. Thus, the finding in Egger et al. can be taken as evidence that 
existing trade agreements on average are relatively ineffective at reducing NTBs, and since it 
is widely agreed upon that NTBs are more important for a transatlantic agreement to be 
successful, this highlights the challenge facing the TTIP agreement. However, Egger et al. 
stress that the bias arising due to failure to control for the presence of firm heterogeneity 
seems less relevant than the endogeneity bias.  
3.2.3 Discussion of the IFO methodology 
Together with the insights from Egger et al. (2011), the IFO method for estimating the effects 
of TTIP is based on the comparative statics methodology from Egger and Larch (2011), as 
sketched above. To construct the counter-factual scenario they estimate the effect of existing 
trade agreements as in Egger and Larch (2011), only using a more comprehensive dataset on 
trade agreements. The results of these estimations are then used to simulate the trade effects 
of TTIP, which is then compared to the base scenario to get percentage change on trade-flows 
and GDP (IFO, 2013b). This implies the underlying assumption that the TTIP agreement will 
affect world trade and countries individual GDP according to the average effect of existing 
trade agreements. All active trade agreements are given equal weights; regardless of the 
members’ initial trade barriers, and the depth and duration of the agreement. This approach is 
somewhat questionable as it is likely that different trade agreements have different levels of 
efficiency regarding their ability to reduce trade costs and induce trade amongst its members.  
Another crucial assumption inherited in their method is that existing trade agreements have 
reduced both tariffs and NTBs between its members. By estimating an average treatment 
effect of trade agreements they therefore claim to have solved the problem of NTB 
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measurement. All trade barrier reductions accomplished in trade agreements, including both 
tariffs and NTBs, are assumed to be implicitly accounted for in the average effect. Explicit 
data on NTBs and tariffs are therefore not included.
 12
 This is arguably a nice feature as it 
captures the realistic level of NTB reduction from trade agreements. However, it also assumes 
that TTIP will follow an average pattern of tariff and NTB reductions observed in other 
agreements, and makes it impossible to look at different scenarios where the depth of the 
agreement can be varied, as is done in the CEPR study. An obvious problem with this is that 
they are unable to look at scenarios where TTIP is assumed to be more effective at NTB 
reduction compared to the average. Most existing trade agreements are primarily (or only) 
agreements on tariff reduction (Estevadeordal et al., 2009). Since the importance of NTB 
reduction is established so clearly in the IFO study, an approach that limits flexibility on this 
deserves criticism. Furthermore, they are unable to be explicit about how much trade barriers 
must be reduced to obtain the predicted results. 
A final critique of the IFO methodology concerns the long term perspective. IFO states that 
all the results in their study are to be understood as long term effects (IFO, 2013a). It is 
generally assumed that the adjustment of the economic variables takes place relatively 
quickly, within 5 - 8 quarters (IFO 2013a). The motivation for this assumption is unclear. 
Remembering the results presented above, it seems somewhat extreme that GDP is inspected 
to increase by 4.95 and 13.38 percent within a maximum of two years, for the EU and US 
respectively. It is also not clear whether the estimated effects are reported in present value. In 
the model framework of Egger and Larch (2011) presented in equations (1) – (5) there is no 
discount factor and they do not mention anything on this in the report. Hence, one reason for 
the large results could be that they do not discount the future. This might also explain some of 
the difference of the results compared to the CEPR study where they use a model in which the 
future is discounted.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 When looking at the limited scenario with tariff elimination only, IFO use data on observable tariffs and 
change these in the counterfactual scenario. It is only in the comprehensive scenario where they use the 
general trade agreements effect to capture both tariff and NTB reduction. 
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3.3 CEPR Methodology 
The results from the CEPR study presented in section 3.1 are obtained from simulations using 
the GTAP model (CEPR 2013). GTAP is a multi-region, multi-sector computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of global world trade. It can be used to analyze long-term as well as 
short-term effects as it allows for trade to impact capital stocks through investment effects 
(CEPR 2013). GTAP uses real world data where tariffs and tariff revenues are explicit in the 
database, and is directly incorporated into the analysis. NTBs on the other hand, are not part 
of the data. To incorporate NTBs into the model CEPR relies on a study by ECORYS 
(2009a). The ECORYS study investigates the existence and magnitude of NTBs between the 
EU and US on trade in goods, services and investments on sector level. Based on a 
comprehensive business survey, ECORYS constructs an NTB index which is used in a gravity 
model to estimate ad-valorem trade cost equivalents of NTBs. These estimates are used 
directly in the CEPR study on TTIP. Therefore, the CEPR results are sensitive to the 
implementation of the gravity model used in the ECORYS study, especially since CEPR 
constantly emphasize the importance of NTBs. How the ECORYS data on NTBs are 
gathered, and how the gravity model is utilized to calculate the ad-valorem trade cost 
equivalents have important consequences for the predictions put forth in the CEPR study. 
3.3.1 Data on NTBs 
Contrary to the IFO, the CEPR methodology requires explicit data on NTBs; hence the use of 
the ECORYS NTB data. Gathering this data is not trivial as NTBs are difficult both to 
identify and to measure. It also requires a clear definition of NTBs. ECORYS, and hence also 
CEPR, define NTBs as: 
“All non-price and non-quantity restrictions on trade in goods, services and investments at 
the federal and state level. This includes border measures (customs procedures, etc.) as well 
as behind-the-border measures flowing from domestic laws, regulations and practices’.” 
(ECORYS, 2009a pp. xiii) 
ECORYS gather data on NTBs using two main sources. First of all they do a comprehensive 
literature review where they summarize previous studies on NTBs and identify transatlantic 
NTBs on sector level. Second, they perform a comprehensive business survey on 5500 
companies in the EU and US. Each company was asked the question:  
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“Consider exporting to the US (EU), keeping in mind your domestic market. If 0 represents a 
completely “free trade” environment, and 100 represents an entirely closed market due to 
NTBs, what value between 0 – 100 would you use to describe the overall restrictiveness of the 
US (EU) market to your export product […] in this sector?” (ECORYS 2009a, p. 10) 
Based on the answers to this question they construct a NTB index. For each importer j the 
index states the average opinion across its exporters on the NTB restrictiveness level. Even 
with 5500, replies the survey was not comprehensive enough to create an index that varies 
bilaterally. Hence, the NTBs of country j is constant for all i’s in the index, i.e. it varies by 
importer only. This is an obvious weakness, as it is natural to assume that different exporters 
will face different levels of NTB regulations for a given importer j. Remembering the 
discussion on fixed effects estimation in chapter 2, this also has consequences for estimation 
as the NTB index does not vary bilaterally.  
3.3.2 Gravity Estimation in ECORYS 
The NTB index constructed on the basis of the business survey is only an index of firm’s 
perceptions of NTB levels and does not translate directly into impacts on costs and prices. 
Therefore, ECORYS use gravity estimation to estimate corresponding ad-valorem trade cost 
equivalents. The trade cost equivalents measure the percentage impact on prices of the NTBs, 
similar to the concept of tariff equivalents. For a given level of a NTB on a product, the trade 
cost equivalents show what the equal increase in any other variables causing trade frictions 
would have to be to keep trade at the same level if the NTB was eliminated. The increase can 
come from tariffs alone or any other variable or combinations of variables that influence trade 
cost. In the case of gravity modelling, this means all variables used to proxy for the trade cost 
term     in equation (3.1) above.  
To calculate the trade cost equivalents, the NTB index is used along with other proxies for 
trade costs in the gravity model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Specifically, the model 
used for estimation is the fixed effects model from equation (2.17): 
( 3.4 ) 
 
                             
 
 
All variations that are unique to one country are inherited in the fixed effect terms (see 
equations (2.19) and (2.20) in chapter 2). The trade cost term is estimated separately as  
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where     is the tariff rate imposed on country i by country j,     is the NTB of country j 
imposed on country i,       is the distance between the capitals in country i and j,       is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the two countries share a border,            is a dummy 
variable indicating whether they are on the same continent, and           is a dummy 
variable indicating whether they have the same official language (ECORYS, 2009b). As 
mentioned above, the NTB data does not vary bilaterally. To solve this problem ECORYS 
make the NTBs vary bilaterally by interacting them with bilateral dummy variables indicating 
membership in existing trade agreements: 
( 3.6 ) 
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Here,      is the NTB index, i.e. the average opinion amongst all exporters on the NTB level 
in country j,     and        are dummy variables that equal 1 if both countries i and j are 
members of the EU or NAFTA, and 
        equals one if the countries are in different 
groups, i.e. if i is in EU and j is in NAFTA or vice versa (ECORYS, 2009b).
  
Interacting the 
NTB index with the dummy variables makes them vary bilaterally, but the interpretation of 
the elasticities changes somewhat. This is discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter 
where I present my own estimations.    
To calculate the trade cost equivalents, ECORYS use the following formula calculated from 
the gravity model in equations (3.4) – (3.6)  
( 3.7 ) 
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where       measures the trade cost equivalent faced by the EU exports to NAFTA member j, 
and      is the average NTB index across all importers (ECORYS, 2009b). Thus the 
expression in (3.7) measures the difference in trade costs when exporting to country j relative 
to the average trade costs in the sample, when    
     = 1. ECORYS obtain the ad-valorem 
trade cost equivalents of the NTB index by solving for       in equation (3.7). 
Table 3.4 shows the average results for the goods sectors. Column (1) and (3) shows the trade 
cost equivalents of NTBs, while column (2) and (4) show the NTB perception index.  
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3.3.3 Discussion of the CEPR methodology and comparison with 
IFO 
CEPR plug the estimated ad-valorem trade cost equivalents from ECORYS into the GTAP 
model to estimate the effect of TTIP. Contrary to the IFO study, this enables CEPR to analyze 
different levels of ambition regarding TTIP’s ability to reduce NTBs. Furthermore, the CEPR 
study does not need assume that the effects of TTIP depends on observed effects of existing 
trade agreements as is the case in the IFO study. A third strength to CEPR over IFO is that by 
using a CGE model they distinguish between short and long term effects, and the results are 
discounted to present value.  
The CEPR method is not without problems, however. An important critique regards the use of 
the GTAP model. This is discussed in the IFO report, which raises three main points of 
critique (IFO 2013a,). First, the parameterization of the model is not always based on 
consistent econometric estimates. Second, the model assumes full employment and a fixed 
labor stock. This limits the model to analyze sectorial interchange of labor rather than long 
term shifts in equilibrium employment. Third, the model is largely based on perfect 
competition. In the CEPR study, the model is calibrated such that perfect competition is 
assumed for most sectors. However, heavy manufacturing sectors are modelled with 
monopolistic competition and economics of scale, and products from different countries are 
modelled as imperfect substitutes (CEPR, 2013).  
Another important critique concerns the NTB measurement. Relying on perceived levels of 
NTBs can be problematic. There might be NTBs that are not accounted for by using this 
method, and so the estimated level of NTB trade cost equivalents might be over- or 
underestimated. Second, the ECORYS business survey does not distinguish between countries 
within the EU as is done in the IFO study. A third point is that by calculating ad-valorem 
Table 3.4: Average NTB trade cost equivalents and NTB perception index for transatlantic trade flows  
 
EU exports to US  US exports to EU 
(1) 
Trade cost equivalent 
(2) 
NTB index 
 
(3) 
Trade cost equivalent 
(4) 
NTB index 
25.4 % 40,74  21.5 % 
 
41,0 
 
Source: table 4.2 in ECORYS (2009a). I have calculated the averages myself as they are reported on 
sector level in the study. 
Table 3.4 Average NT B trade cost equivalent s and NT B pre cepti on i ndex for transatlanti c trade flows  
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trade cost equivalent, NTBs are effectively converted into proportional trade costs. However, 
as discussed above it is more natural to consider NTBs as non-proportional costs, which 
might affect trade in other ways than proportional costs, as argued by Egger et al. (2011). 
By looking closely at the methods used in the two studies it becomes clear how the gravity 
equation can be used in very different ways, and with different purposes. In the IFO study the 
gravity equation plays a defining role in determining the outcome as they are comparing 
different gravity estimations. In CEPR on the other hand, the gravity equations plays a smaller 
role as it is used only to obtain the estimates of NTB cost equivalents to be used in the GTAP 
model. However, in both studies the impact of NTBs is accounted for through the use of 
gravity equations; implicitly through the average effect of trade agreements on tariff and NTB 
reductions in IFO, and explicitly by calculating ad-valorem trade cost equivalents in the 
ECORYS study used by CEPR.  
In the next chapter I run a separate gravity estimation using a dataset including data on tariffs, 
NTBs and bilateral trade agreements. I rely on data from other sources than both the IFO and 
CEPR (ECORYS) studies, and my results can therefore be used to verify some of their 
results, as well as provide further understanding on how the gravity equation is used for trade 
policy analysis.  
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4 Estimation 
In this chapter, I present my own gravity estimations built upon the theoretical and empirical 
insight from chapter 2. In particular, I estimate the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model 
with data from Kee et al. (2009), who have constructed a comprehensive dataset on NTBs and 
tariffs. Another important contribution to my dataset is a dummy variable on regional trade 
agreements (RTA) from de Sousa (2011). Throughout the chapter the focus will be on 
estimating the effects of NTBs and different RTA dummies on bilateral exports; first, I 
discuss the econometric specification, second I describe the dataset and discuss some 
descriptive statistics, and finally I present and discuss the results of my estimations.  
4.1 Econometric specification  
Recall the regression version of the Anderson and van Wincoop gravity equation, along with 
its log-linearized version from chapter 2, where the multilateral resistance terms    and    are 
defined by equations (2.13) – (2.14): 
( 4.1 ) 
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As mentioned in chapter 2, Anderson and van Wincoop assume symmetrical trade costs, 
       , which makes them able to solve the model in terms of observables (Anderson and 
van Wincoop, 2003). Then they use NLS estimation to obtain their results. By doing this they 
avoid log-linearization and exclusion of zero-observations in the regression. However, the 
assumption of symmetrical trade costs is quite strong, so I will therefore modify their 
approach. By using the PPML estimator discussed in chapter 2, I avoid the problem of zero-
observations and heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, due to lack of bilateral NTB data as in 
ECORYS (2009a), I use Taylor approximations on the multilateral resistance terms as 
suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2009). I will explain the data issue and introduce the 
Baier and Bergstrand method shortly, but first it is necessary to specify the trade costs. 
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4.1.1 Trade costs 
As bilateral trade costs,    , are not directly observable it is necessary to use observable 
proxies. As is frequently done the gravity literature, I use bilateral distance along with a 
number of dummy variables containing information on bilateral cultural and historical 
relationships as proxies. In addition to this, I add a dummy variable for RTAs, data on tariffs 
and an estimate of the ad-valorem tariff equivalents of NTBs. I use the standard functional 
form for the trade costs as in equation (2.15). Thus, trade costs are given by 
 
( 4.2 ) 
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where     is the distance between i and j,    are tariffs imposed j,    are the ad-valorem tariff 
equivalents of NTBs imposed by j and       is a dummy variable indicating whether i and j 
are fellow members of a trade agreement. Note that both tariffs and NTBs are denoted only 
with subscript j. This is because the data is taken from the Kee et al. (2009) dataset, which 
unfortunately only includes one-dimensional trade barrier data – the same problem faced by 
ECORYS (2009a). 
I have also included interaction terms between the RTA dummy variable and both tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. Note that since the RTA dummy is bilateral, this makes the interaction 
terms vary bilaterally as well. It is natural to expect that trade agreements will reduce the 
impact of trade barriers, but it is not certain how exports are affected differently by NTBs 
when the RTA dummy is active, relative to when it is inactive. The interaction terms might 
provide some insight on this, and a simple example using exports and NTBs only will 
illustrate (country subscripts are dropped for simplicity). 
( 4.3 ) 
 
                               
 
 
In this simple case, the effect of NTBs on exports will be given by 
  
    
          . 
When there are no trade agreements (     ) we get  
  
    
   , where       is 
expected. Now, if the countries in question are engaged in a trade agreement (     ), then 
  
    
      . The sign of    is not as straightforward to interpret. It affects the slope of the 
line in (4.3) with respect to NTBs. A negative sign on    means that each percentage point 
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reduction in NTB tariff equivalents within a trade agreement (remember,       ) will 
increase exports more than if      . Or, If a country within a trade agreement decides to 
deviate and impose a new NTB on its fellow members or to increase an old one (assuming for 
now that they are able to do so and get away with it), the county’s exports will drop more than 
it would if the country was not a member of a trade agreement.  
The interpretation of    is not straightforward either. Strictly, it measures the effect of RTA’s 
when NTBs are zero. However, this does not make much sense, economically speaking. It is 
more fruitful to consider the total effect of RTA’s: 
  
    
         . 
Finally, the last 6 variables in equation (4.3) are dummy variables controlling for historical 
and cultural relations. Contig indicates if the two countries share a border, Comlang indicates 
whether the two countries share official language, Colony indicates whether the two countries 
were ever in a colonial relationship, Comcol indicates if they have had the same colonizer 
after 1945, Col45 indicates whether a country pair have been in a colonial relationship after 
1945 and Smctry indicates whether two countries ever have been the same country.  
4.1.2 Baier and Bergstrand (2009) – an alternative to fixed effects 
estimation 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the data used in the ECORYS (2009a) study had the 
same problem with one-dimensional NTB-data. They solved the problem by constructing 
interaction terms between the NTB cost equivalents with bilateral dummy variables. But as 
shown in the example above, this makes the interpretation of the coefficients a bit messy. I 
will try to avoid this in my estimation which means that I cannot use fixed effects.  
To tackle this problem, Baier and Bergstrand (2009) suggest a different approach. By using a 
first-order log-linear Taylor-series expansion of the multilateral resistance terms in equations 
(2.13) and (2.14) they arrive at the following expressions for the multilateral resistance terms 
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which are analogous to (2.13) and (2.14) (Baier and Bergstrand (2009). To make their results 
comparable to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Baier and Bergstrand assume symmetrical 
trade costs, but they stress that, for estimation, the multilateral resistance approximations in 
(4.4) and (4.5) are  “…effectively identical under symmetric or asymmetric bilateral trade 
costs” (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009 footnote 5). Adding the terms yields 
( 4.6 ) 
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This can be inserted into the log linearized version of the model in equation (4.1) to get: 
( 4.7 ) 
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Baier and Bergstrand (2009) use the same dataset as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and 
get very similar results. They also do various Monte Carlo exercises and show that the 
multilateral resistance approximations give virtually identical coefficients compared to fixed 
effects and nonlinear least squares estimation. Next, I incorporate this into my model. Taking 
the logs of the trade costs in (4.2) yields: 
( 4.9 ) 
 
                                                         
                                                       
            
 
 
Furthermore, I follow Shepard (2013) and assume that 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
, i.e. that all countries 
have an equal share of world GDP. This assumption is quite strong, but it makes it possible to 
regard the terms in (4.8) as means, which simplifies calculations. Inserting (4.9) and 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 into (4.8) yields the expression for trade costs (see appendix A3 for the calculation): 
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where the different terms are defined as follows: 
( 4.11 ) 
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The cultural and historical variables,       
  
         
  
          
        
  
         
 
 and 
      
  
  are constructed in a similar manner, following the same pattern. To save space, I 
have moved these expressions to appendix A4.  
Putting it all together yields the following gravity equation, which controls for multilateral 
resistance while still allowing for country-specific variation: 
( 4.17 ) 
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Equation (4.17) is the econometric version on the Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model 
when using proxies for trade costs, and controlling for multilateral resistance through use of 
Taylor approximations according to Baier and Bergstrand (2009). 
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4.1.3 PPML estimation 
If I were to follow Baier and Bergstrand (2009) I would estimate (4.17) using OLS. However, 
I wish to use PPML estimation to avoid the heteroskedasticity and zero-observation bias, as 
discussed in chapter 2. Therefore I will modify (4.17) in the regression by using exports 
instead of log of exports on the left hand side while keeping the right hand side variables in 
log form. This way of specifying the PPML-regression highly is convenient for interpretation 
of the results as it allows me to keep interpreting the coefficients as elasticities as in the log-
log OLS model (Shepard, 2013). The dummy variables also have the same interpretations. 
This way of specifying PPML-regressions of gravity models has become standard in the 
literature and is used in many papers, including Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Shepard (2013) 
and Egger and Larch (2011). However, the main inspiration comes from Francois and 
Manchin (2013) who use PPML estimation with Taylor approximations for multilateral 
resistance in their gravity estimation. 
4.1.4 Summing up the econometric approach 
Three important points emerge from the discussion so far. First, Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) emphasize the need to control for multilateral resistance. Second, since my variables 
of interest, i.e. tariffs and NTBs vary by country only, I cannot use fixed effects estimation. 
Therefore, I follow Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and use a first-order log-linear Taylor-series 
expansion of the multilateral resistance terms. Third, I eliminate the potential 
heteroskedasticity and selection biases from using log-linear OLS estimation by using the 
PPML estimator as suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006).  
4.2 Data 
The dataset combines data on bilateral trade relations within five sectors for 100 countries. 
The data is gathered from five separate sources and contains data on bilateral exports, the 
trade barriers faced by exporters (tariff as well as non-tariff barriers), trade agreements, GDP, 
bilateral distances and a number of historical and cultural relations. The purpose of this 
section is to explain how the different data sources have been adapted and put together to 
make the final gravity dataset, and to discuss its strengths and limitations. 
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4.2.1 Data on trade barriers 
The dataset on trade restrictiveness by Kee et al. (2009) is the point of departure for the final 
dataset as the main goal of my estimations is to estimate the effect of tariffs and NTBs on 
trade flows. Kee et al. (2009) have constructed a comprehensive dataset with trade barrier 
data on a six-digit level of product division for 104 countries. The variables of interest in their 
dataset for my purposes are data on import tariffs and ad-valorem estimates of NTBs. Kee et 
al. (2009) define NTBs as price control measures, quantity restrictions and technical 
regulations (hereunder also health and hygiene regulations). This is an important contrast to 
ECORYS and CEPR, where quantity and price control measures are excluded from the 
definition (see chapter 3). In this sense the Kee et al. definition of NTBs is broader than the 
ECORYS definition.   
Using estimated tariff equivalents of NTBs is the same method used by CEPR in their study 
on TTIP. However, there are some crucial differences between the dataset by Kee et al. 
(2009) and the one used by CEPR. Recall that CEPR uses estimates of trade cost equivalents 
of NTBs from the ECORYS 2009 study
13
. For their study, ECORYS constructed a unique 
dataset based mainly on business surveys (see chapter 3). Kee. et al. (2009) use a different 
approach. They rely on tariff and NTB data from the TRAINS
14
 database. The NTB data in 
this database is gathered from a large number of sources. NTBs applied by countries are 
collected from national sources such as Ministries of Trade, Ministries of Agriculture etc. 
(UNCTAD, 2009). Data from the private sector is gathered from two different sources; (i) 
firm level surveys as in ECORYS and (ii) firms reporting NTBs they meet when exporting to 
a particular country on UNCTADs
15
 web-based portal (UNCTAD, 2009). Both these methods 
can be somewhat unsatisfactory as it leaves the question of who is reporting, what is reported, 
and who it is that answer the surveys. Custom delays and bad infrastructure, e.g. bad roads or 
communications in importing country, are an example of a trade barrier which may not be 
reported as frequently as e.g. import quotas or sanitary requirements. However, these trade 
barriers, particularly infrastructure, are important determinants of trade costs (Limão and 
Venables, 1999).  Also, as mentioned in chapter 2 it is important to keep in mind that firms 
survey’s might also produce incomplete data, as it is not given that all NTBs facing a firm 
                                                 
13
 Note that Kee et al. (2009) calculate tariff equivalents and ECOYRS calculate trade-cost equivalents.  
14
 TRAINS: Trade Analysis and Information System 
15
 UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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will be picked up by the survey. These arguments show how the TRAINS database on NTBs 
might be incomplete, which is important to keep in mind when reviewing the results. 
Kee et al. (2009) use the NTB data from TRAINS to create a comprehensive dataset at the 
six-digit level of the Harmonized System of Trade Classification (HS-6). As mentioned in the 
previous section the data is constant across exporters for a given importer, i.e. it does not vary 
bilaterally. Kee et al. constructs NTBs as dummy variables; if product k in country i is subject 
to a NTB, then       . This is contrary to ECORYS (2009a) who, based on their business 
survey, constructs a NTB index.  
The ad-valorem tariff equivalents of the NTB dummies are obtained, as in ECORYS (2009a), 
through gravity analysis. For each product, they estimate what a tariff would have to be to 
keep trade at the same level if the NTB was eliminated.  
Limitations due to the Kee et al. dataset 
A limitation in the Kee et al. (2009) dataset is that it is a cross section. This means that I am 
unable to use a panel dataset in the analysis. The data is gathered from whenever the most 
recent year data is available between 2000 and 2004.
 16
 They claim that more than half of the 
tariffs are from 2003 or 2004, while only three countries have data from 2000. Of these, only 
two are included in my final dataset
17
.  
The NTB data is gathered over a larger time period; from 1992 to 2004. This poses a potential 
problem as the removal of NTBs or creations of new NTBs might not be picked up. 
Furthermore, I am unable to analyze how NTBs have evolved relative to tariffs over time. It 
would have been ideal to have better data, so I could construct a panel and see whether the 
relative importance of tariffs and NTBs have changed over time, as is argued by e.g. the 
World Bank (2012). There are two main reasons for why a panel might show signs of this. 
First, since 2004 there has been more integration of the world into trade agreements, and 
given the nature of NTBs, it is more difficult to eliminate these in trade agreements relative to 
tariffs. Hence, most trade agreements have better cover of tariffs than of NTBs, as argued by 
Estevadeordal et al. (2009), and it is natural to assume that more tariff than non-tariff barriers 
have been removed in recent years.   
                                                 
16
 Although the paper was published in 2009 the dataset was constructed and made available for download on 
the World Bank website in 2005. Therefore the data is from 2004 and before. 
17
 Kazakhstan and Peru are included. Egypt is excluded due to lack of export data.  
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Second, it might be the case that countries have used NTBs as substitutes for tariffs as trade 
agreements have forced tariff levels down. Kee et al. (2009) provides some evidence of this in 
the paper accompanying their dataset. They regress NTBs on tariffs and discover a negative 
relationship, indicating that NTBs act as substitutes for tariffs when controlling for both 
product and country specific effects (Kee et al., 2009 table 2). The result is highly significant, 
but small in magnitude, with an elasticity of -0.003, meaning that a one percent decrease in 
tariffs will lead to a 0.003 percent increase in the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of NTBs. If this 
is true we would expect to see NTB levels increase relative to tariffs. 
Countries in the final dataset  
Since data on tariffs and NTBs are crucial for the regression analysis, the Kee et al. dataset 
limits the number of includable countries. See appendix A5 for a complete list of the countries 
that are included in the final dataset. Note that the final number only amounts to 100 
countries. This is due to lack of export data for some countries (more on this below). Note 
also that most EU and European countries, as well as USA, are included
18
. Also, most other 
countries in Europe, the US and the largest economies in Asia, Africa, North and South 
America are included. 
100 countries is an adequate number for gravity analysis
19
. It would be preferable, however, 
to be able to include more. While the largest economies in the world and the most important 
trade partners for both the EU and the US are included, many smaller economies are 
excluded. In some lower income countries or countries with lower level of transparency, 
statistical databases might not be as easily accessible and it might be harder to administer the 
distribution of firm level surveys, or to establish systems for reporting trade barriers. This 
gives rise to a potential selection bias as the exclusion cannot be said to be totally random. As 
an illustration of this, the mean GDP (measured in million USD) is 564.3 in the Kee et al. 
dataset and 213.3 in the original data from the World Development Index (WDI), which 
contains GDP data on the whole world. In other words, excluding countries due to limitations 
in Kee et al. (2009) raises the average GDP by more than half. While a formal discussion of 
this is beyond the scope my thesis, it is important to keep this potential bias in mind.  
 
                                                 
18
 Cyprus, Slovakia, Luxemburg, Lichtenstein and Malta are the only excluded countries from the EU and the 
EEA  
19
 IFO use 126 and ECORYS use 40. 
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Sectors 
Kee et al. (2009) provide high level of disaggregation in their trade barrier data. For my 
purpose, such a level of detail is not necessary.  However, it is desirable with some form of 
disaggregation as it can be interesting to look at how NTBs affect sectors asymmetrically. 
Therefore I have made use of the high level of disaggregation in the original dataset and 
divided the tariff data into five main sectors. Table 4.1 gives a summary of these sectors and 
how they correspond to the HS 1996 product classification system. The classification is taken 
from Melchior et al. (2014). 
 
Unfortunately, the data provided by Kee et al. is incomplete when it comes to oil and gas. In 
the dataset there is only tariff and NTB data on gas (HS 2711), not on crude oil (HS 2709) or 
crude oil products (HS 2710). Therefore, I have decided to exclude the oil and gas sector from 
the analysis. 
4.2.2 Other data sources  
Data on bilateral trade 
Data on bilateral trade is taken from the UN COMTRADE database. I use data on bilateral 
exports on sector level from 2004 in accordance with the HS 1996 sector classification in 
Table 4.1. There are some exceptions however. Due to lack of 2004 data for Nepal, Nigeria 
and the Central African Republic data on these countries is from 2003. For Bhutan there is 
Table 4.1: Sector classification 
Sector no. Sector name Content keywords HS Chapters 
1 Agriculture Agriculture and seafood 
 
1-24 
2 Oil and Gas  
 
2709-2711 
3 Heavy Industries Chemicals and plastic, 
metals and other minerals 
25, 26, 27 ex. oil and gas, 
28-39, 72, 7401-7413, 75, 
7601-14, 78-81 
4 Light Industries Textile goods, shoes, leather 
goods and other industries 
 
40-71, 73, 7414-19, 7615-
16, 82, 83, 91-97 
5 Machinery and transport equipment  84-90 
Table 4.1: Sector classification 
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data for 2005 only. A total of four countries from the Kee et al (2009) dataset are excluded 
from the final dataset due to lack of data on exports; Chad, Lao PDR, Equatorial Guinea and 
Egypt.  
CEPII gravity data 
The French CEPII
20
 institute has published a dataset containing many of the variables and 
dummies commonly used in gravity estimations. The primary variable of interest for my 
purposes is the measure of bilateral distances between countries’ capitols. Additionally, there 
are bilateral dummy variables on cultural and historical relations as explained above. 
Data on GDP 
For GDP data I have used the World Development Index of 2005. GDP is measured in current 
USD. 
Data on regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
I also use bilateral dummy variables indicating whether given a pair of importers and 
exporters are partners in a trade agreement. I use data for 2004 only. This data is constructed 
by José de Sousa (2011) and are gathered from three different sources. One potential issue is 
that I use trade data for 2004. In May 2004 the EU was expanded by ten countries. It might be 
that the effects of the expansion are not fully accounted for in the trade data for 2004. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for the main variables to be used in the estimations. 
Some interesting points emerge. The average tariff barrier in the dataset is 10 percent across 
all sectors
21
. This is lower than the estimated ad-valorem tariff equivalent for NTBs which 
average 13.8 percent in the data. Note also that the standard deviation on tariffs is much lower 
compared to the standard deviation on NTBs. This has two implications. First, the summary 
data indicate that NTBs are a bigger problem for international trade flows than tariffs. This 
highlights the importance of including regulations on NTBs for current and future trade 
agreements such as TTIP. This argument is also put forth by both IFO and CEPR. Second, the 
standard deviations imply that NTBs are more unevenly spread and that their effect on trade 
                                                 
20
 Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales 
21
 Excluding oil and gas as there is limited data on trade barriers in these sectors. 
47 
 
flows might vary substantially across products and sectors. A more thorough discussion on 
this follows below.  
Table 4. 2 : Summary statistics  
 
I have also included summary statistics for the original dummy variable on NTBs used by 
Kee. et al (2009) as the basis for their estimations of NTB tariff equivalents. This shows that 
37.6 percent of the products in the dataset are subject to a NTB. Once again this highlights the 
importance of NTBs in world trade.  
Table 4.2 shows that of the 9900 bilateral trade relations, 17 percent are fellow members of a 
trade agreement.
 22
 I have also included summary statistics for a RTA dummy restricted to the 
                                                 
22
 N countries gives N(N-1) bilateral country pairs. With 100 countries: 100*99 = 9900. 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Log of exporter GDP 18.2237 1.9805 13.4627 23.2310 
Log of importer GDP 18.15406 2.0059 13.4627 23.2310 
Tariffs 0.1002 0.1008 0 0.7330 
NTB dummy 0.3759 0.4035 0 1 
NTB tariff equivalent 0.1381 0.1629 0 0.7445 
RTA dummy 0.1710 0.3765 0 1 
Restricted  
RTA Dummy 
0.0516 0.2213 0 1 
Log of distance 8.6252 0.8552 4.3943 9.8920 
Contiguity  0.0339 0.1810 0 1 
Common colonizer  0.0583 0.2344 0 1 
Common language  0.1423 0.3493 0 1 
Colony post 1945 0.0119 0.1084 0 1 
Same country 0.0116 0.1072 0 1 
Summary statistics excludes oil and gas sectors. Total observations: 30519. 
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EU and EEA, NAFTA and ANZCERTA trade agreements
23
. Note that five percent of the 
bilateral trade relations in the dataset are covered by these trade agreements. They are 
included based on a somewhat ad hoc assumption that they are the world’s most efficient at 
reducing trade barriers amongst their members. However, in recent years many 
comprehensive trade agreements have been signed. In a meta-analysis on the effects of RTAs 
on bilateral trade flows in gravity studies Cipollina and Slavatici (2010) find that the effect of 
RTAs “…tend to get larger as for more recent years, which could be a consequence of the 
evolution from  “shallow” to “deep” trade agreements” (pp. 77). I argue that since I use 
somewhat old data (from 2004), the agreements covered by the restricted RTA dummy can 
indeed be considered among the most efficient at reducing trade barriers in the sample. The 
efficiency of these trade agreements is to some extent supported by the findings in 
Estevadeordal et al. (2009) and Cipollina and Salavatici (2010). However, I wish to stress that 
the restriction on the RTA dummy is somewhat ad hoc, which might influence the results, but 
that a thorough discussion on the relative efficiency of existing RTAs is beyond the scope of 
my thesis. Note that when use I the term efficiency in association with trade agreements in the 
following, it refers to the extent the trade agreement is able to reduce trade barriers, and thus 
induce trade amongst the member countries.  
The last five rows of table 4.2 show summary statistics for the various historical and cultural 
dummy variables. The common language variable is by far the most prominent one. On 
average more than 14 percent of the country pairs share a common official language. The 
remaining historical and cultural variables are less prominent with means varying between 1 
and 5 percent.  
4.3.1 Sector-level summary statistics 
As mentioned above, there is reason to believe that NTBs and tariffs are unevenly spread 
across sectors. Therefore I also include disaggregated summary statistics for selected 
variables in table 4.3. Here, the data have been divided according to table 4.1, excluding the 
                                                 
23
 EU (2004): Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Cyprus, Slovakia, 
Luxemburg and Malta. The last four are excluded due to data restrictions. 
EEA: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein is excluded due to data restrictions.  
NAFTA: Canada, Mexico and USA 
ANZERTA: Australia and New Zealand 
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oil and gas sector. The agricultural sector is subject to the highest trade protection both in 
terms of tariffs and NTBs; over 60 percent of agricultural products are subject to a NTB and 
the estimated tariff equivalents of NTBs are higher than the observed tariffs.  
This is also the case for the heavy industries sector. Note that in this case the difference 
between estimated NTB tariff equivalents and observed tariffs are very large. This can be 
taken as an indication that this sector is most prone to substituting tariffs with NTBs. In the 
two remaining sectors, NTB means are significantly lower at 8 and 7 percent. Also, the 
difference between NTBs and tariffs are smaller in these sectors.  
4.3.2 TTIP summary statistics  
Table 4.4 is a version of table 4.3 including TTIP members only (i.e. EU and US). Here, 
aggregated summary statistics and exports for all sectors are included as well to give an 
impression of the relative trade volume. Observe that all the four sectors reported show 
substantial trade. It is also evident that the trade falls with the level of trade protection. In the 
machinery and transport equipment sector, trade is largest, while tariffs and estimated NTB 
tariff equivalents are very low with means around one percent. 
In agriculture the trade barriers are high. An average of 75.5 percent of all products is subject 
to a NTB giving an estimated 30 percent tariff equivalent in this sector. The tariffs are also 
very high compared to the other sectors. Consequently, transatlantic trade in this sector is 
lower than in the others. This shows the potential inherited in a transatlantic trade agreement 
for the agricultural sector. According to IFO (2013a), agriculture will be the sector where 
Table 4.3: Summary statistics for selected variables on sector level 
 
 Sector 
 Agriculture 
 
Heavy industries 
 
Light industries 
 Machinery and  
Transport equipment 
Variable Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean St. dev. 
Tariffs 0.1783 0.1236 
 
0.0407 0.0564 
 
0.1178 0.0905 
 
0.0627 0.0550 
NTB dummy 0.6275 0.3539 
 
0.4316 0.4843 
 
0.2689 0.3053 
 
0.1954 0.3106 
NTB tariff 
equivalents 
0.2214 0.1377 
 
0.1872 0.2197 
 
0.0808 0.0965 
 
0.0726 0.1215 
 Observations 7385  7281  8163  7690 
Table 4. 3 : Summary statistics for sele cted vari able s on sect or level  
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there is most to gain in TTIP. Looking at table 4.4 this becomes obvious; there is huge 
potential in lowering agricultural trade barriers. However, whether this is realistic is not clear. 
Agriculture is an area where the EU and US do not necessarily agree; an example is the case 
of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) where there is much debate around where to draw 
the line (NFD, 2014). 
There is a clear distinction between the summary statistics in table 4.4 and the CEPR data. 
The average NTB tariff equivalent is 13.1 percent while the average is 22.5 percent for goods 
trade in the CEPR study (CEPR, 2013). Furthermore, table 4.4 shows that tariffs and NTBs 
are low in the machinery and transport sector, while this is one of the sectors where CEPR 
predicts the largest gains from TTIP. This might be an aggregation issue as CEPR have more 
sectors, or it might have to do with the broader definition of NTBs in Kee et al. (2009). In any 
case, this shows how unstable NTB data can be, and how difficult it is to get good data. 
 
4.3.3 Correlation matrices 
Table 4.5 contains correlations between selected variables. Correlations only show the linear 
association between the variables, and cannot be used to make any conclusions. For this, 
Table 4.4: Summary statistics for selected variables, TTIP only 
Table 4.4: Summary statistics for selected variables on sector level, TTIP only 
 
 Sector   
 Agriculture 
 
Heavy industries 
 
Light industries 
 Machinery and  
Transport 
equipment 
 
All 
Variable Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean 
Tariffs 0.1296 0.0510 
 
0.0038 0.0104 
 
0.0330 0.0278 
 
0.0166 0.0264 
 
0.0458 
NTB 
dummy 
0.7556 0.2592 
 
0.2041 0.3913 
 
0.3382 0.1808 
 
0.0363 0.6820 
 
0.3335 
NTB tariff 
equivalents 
0.3066 0.1250 
 
0.0967 0.1825 
 
0.1112 0.0684 
 
0.0102 0.0190 
 
0.1312 
Exports 418.9 977.6 
 
1302.6 3001.0 
 
962.2 1937.7 
 
2398.7 5873.8 
 
1270.6 
Observations 420  420  420  420  1680 
NB: exports measured in current million USD 
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formal estimation is needed. However, it is useful to examine the correlation matrix to get a 
sense of the general behavior in the data.  
Overall the correlations in table 4.5 are in line with intuition; there is a negative linear 
association between exports and both tariffs and NTBs, and a positive linear association 
between exports and the RTA dummy. Note that in panel B the RTA dummy variable is 
restricted to the EU and EEA, NAFTA and ANZCERTA agreements only. In this case the 
correlation between exports and tariffs is stronger. Note also that the unrestricted dummy 
variable in panel A show a weak positive correlation with NTBs, while in panel B the 
correlation is negative and larger in absolute value, i.e. there is a reversal of the direction and 
a strengthening of the linear relationship between the RTA dummy and NTBs when 
restricting the RTA dummy. Again it is important to stress that no conclusions can be made 
from correlations alone. In particular, the correlations must not be taken as causal arguments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Correation 
matrix on selected 
variables 
Table 4.5: Correlation matrix on selected variables 
 
Panel A: using the unrestricted RTA dummy 
 RTA dummy Exports Tariffs NTBs 
 
RTA dummy 
 
1 - - - 
 
Exports 
 
0.0998 1 - - 
 
Tariffs 
 
-0.0652 -0.605 1 - 
 
NTBs 
 
0.0077 -0.0249 0.1713 1 
 
Panel B: using the restricted RTA dummy 
 
Restricted 
RTA dummy 
Exports Tariffs NTBs 
 
Restricted 
RTA dummy 
 
1 - - - 
 
Exports 
 
0.1504 1 - - 
 
Tariffs 
 
-0.1211 -0.605 1 - 
 
NTBs 
 
-0.0103 -0.0249 0.1713 1 
NB: the correlations are based on the original formatting of the data from Kee et al. 
(2009), i.e. I do not use applied tariffs and NTBs here like in the regressions. This is 
because there is no need to have the data on tariffs and NTBs in log form. When using 
log of applied tariffs and NTBs instead however, the signs all stay the same and the 
correlations are very similar in magnitude.  
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4.4 Estimation results 
4.4.1 Main regression results 
The results are presented in table 4.6 which contains five different estimations. I use Stata 
version 13.1 for all my estimations. Columns (i) and (ii) contain my main regression results. 
Here the dependent variables inherited in the trade cost term from equation (4.2) correspond 
to equation (4.11) – (4.22) and thus include Taylor approximations of the multilateral trade 
cost terms, following Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Also, to combat the issue of 
heteroskedasticity and zero-observations, columns (i) and (ii) are estimated using PPML-
estimation. Note that even though the dependent variable in columns (i) and (ii) are exports 
rather than log of exports the dependent variables are still specified as logarithms (except for 
the dummy variables), as discussed above. 
A note on interpretation of the coefficients with multilateral resistance 
The regressions in columns (i) and (ii) in table 4.6 are based on the Taylor approximation of 
the multilateral resistance terms as in Baier and Bergstrand (2009). This changes their 
interpretation somewhat. The coefficients now account for both the direct effect of a change in 
an independent variable for a bilateral relation i and j, and the indirect effect of a change in the 
same variable between country i and all other countries, as well as with j and all other 
countries. For instance, the RTA dummy variable accounts for the effect of trading with a 
fellow member of a trade agreement, but it also accounts for the effect of other trading 
partners being part of a trade agreement. This could have a negative effect for the exports of a 
country, as it will be faced with relatively less demand if other trading partners are engaged in 
trade agreements. This is the nature of the multilateral resistance concept, but when using 
fixed effects estimation, as in e.g. ECORYS (2009) the indirect effect is soaked up by the 
country dummies. For all my results the direct effect dominates, so the coefficients can be 
interpreted straightforward, but the indirect effects might alter the magnitude of the effects. 
4.4.2 Other empirical specifications 
Columns (iii) and (iv) are estimated using fixed effects with PPML and OLS estimation. I 
have also included estimation of the naïve gravity equation in column (v), i.e.          
                          , where the only proxy for trade costs is bilateral  
53 
 
Table 4.6: Regression results 
Table 4.6: Regression results 
  
 Method of estimation 
 PPML PPML, fixed 
effects 
OLS, fixed effects OLS 
 (i) (ii) 
 
(iii) (iv) (v) 
Independent 
variables: 
Dependent variable: 
Exports 
Dependent variable: 
log of exports 
Log of exporter 
GDP 
 
 
0.7829** 
(0.000) 
0.7760** 
(0.000) 
- - 1.2605** 
(0.000) 
Log of importer 
GDP 
 
 
0.7836** 
(0.000) 
0.7806** 
(0.000) 
- - 0.8961** 
(0.000) 
Log of tariffs 
 
 
-3.348** 
(0.000) 
-3.8620** 
(0.000) 
- - - 
Log of NTBs 
 
 
-2.405 ** 
(0.000) 
-2.2400** 
(0.000) 
- - - 
RTA tariff  
Interaction 
 
-1.6370 
(0.251) 
0.6005 
(0.495) 
- - - 
RTA NTB  
interaction 
 
-0.5223 
(0.290) 
-1.7512** 
(0. 000) 
- - - 
RTA dummy 
 
 
0.7692** 
(0.000) 
0.4499** 
(0.001) 
0.9003** 
(0.000) 
0.5536** 
(0.000) 
- 
Log of distance 
 
 
-0.5403** 
(0.000) 
-0.6494** 
(0.000) 
-0.5148** 
(0.000) 
-1.3613** 
(0.000) 
-1.3851** 
(0.000) 
Contiguity dummy 
 
 
0.1806 
(0.328) 
0.2120 
(0.204) 
0.3359** 
(0.001) 
0.4425** 
(0.004) 
- 
Colony dummy 
 
 
0.0261 
(0.888) 
-0.0791 
(0.670) 
0.1520 
(0.278) 
0.4380** 
(0.002) 
- 
Common colonizer 
dummy 
 
0.0014 
(0.998) 
-0.1360 
(0.824) 
0.7137** 
(0.000) 
1.0543** 
(0.000) 
- 
Common language 
dummy 
 
0.1245 
(0.500) 
0.1799 
(0.323) 
0.0756 
(0.485) 
0.6141** 
(0.000) 
- 
Colony post 1945 
dummy 
 
0.9665** 
(0.000) 
1.0593** 
(0.000) 
0.9410** 
(0.000) 
1.0543** 
(0.000) 
- 
Same country  
Dummy 
 
1.264** 
(0.001) 
1.3690** 
(0.003) 
0.1742 
(0.334) 
0 .5199* 
(0.035) 
- 
Constant term -6.8514** 
(0.003) 
-4.1478* 
(0.019) 
5.1206** 
(0.000) 
8.8037** 
(0.000) 
-20.042** 
(0.000) 
R
2 
0.48 0.48 0.55 0.68 0.58 
Observations 30519 30519 30519 30517 30517 
RTA dummy: Full Restricted Full Full - 
** and * denotes significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. P-values are reported in the parenthesis. I use robust 
standard errors as is standard in the gravity literature (Shepard, 2013). 
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distance, and multilateral resistance is not controlled for. As discussed above, the estimations 
in column (iii) – (v) cannot be used to discuss the impact of the NTBs in my dataset, and are 
included only for robustness and comparison with the literature. Looking at the different 
methods of estimation in table 3.7 some interesting points can be made. Observe the different 
pattern when using PPML estimations compared to OLS. First of all the coefficients on GDP 
are strikingly different in column (i) and (iv). OLS regressions of gravity equations tend to 
show the same pattern of a higher value on the coefficient on GDP (Silva and Tenreyro, 
2006). It is also a familiar result that the true coefficients on GDP are close to 1, as discussed 
in chapter 2. Both these observations are non-existent when using the PPML estimator. As in 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the GDP estimates in column (i) and (ii) are between 0.7 and 0.8 
and quite similar in magnitude.  
Another point, also put forth by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), is that the coefficient on distance 
drops dramatically when using the PPML estimator. This leads us to conclude that 
geographical distance is not as important a trade barrier as previously thought. Lastly, and 
also in accordance with Silva and Tenreyro, fewer of the coefficients on historical and cultural 
linkages are statistically significant.  
All in all it is evident that the estimation results are sensitive to the estimation method. Using 
the PPML gives more reliable results as they allow for both heteroskedasticity and zero-trade 
flows. For this reason, the PPML-estimator has become the workhorse estimator for gravity 
equations (Shepard, 2013). Furthermore, the results in table 4.6 indicate that my dataset 
behaves as expected relative what is common in the literature according to e.g. Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) and Head and Mayer (2014). 
4.5 Discussion of the results 
4.5.1 Tariff and NTB results 
The coefficients on tariffs and NTBs in column (i) are both large in magnitude, negative and 
highly significant. As expected, exports are highly sensitive to protective measures like tariffs 
and NTBs. Perhaps surprisingly, the elasticity on tariffs is larger than the elasticity on NTBs. 
However, it is important to stress that this does not mean that my results violate the argument 
that NTBs are more important trade barriers that tariffs. The coefficients on NTBs and tariffs 
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in table 4.6 are elasticities and do not contain any information on the relative importance of 
either NTBs or tariffs. Furthermore, as shown above, tariff levels are relatively low, so the 
possibility for tariff reductions is limited, while NTB levels are higher and the scope for 
reductions is larger. Therefore, it is likely that there is more potential for trade increases due 
to NTB reductions, as is argued by both IFO and CEPR. 
Another reason for the larger coefficient on tariffs relative to NTBs in table 4.6 could be that 
the indirect effect through multilateral resistance terms is larger for NTBs than for tariffs. 
Since tariffs are more discriminatory, as argued in the previous chapter, it is likely that 
exports from i to j will increase more if tariffs rather than NTBs are reduced between them, 
since this reduction will concern i and j only. On the other hand, if NTBs are reduced between 
i and j, this may implicitly reduce NTBs between all i and j’s trading partners through the 
spillover effects. Thus, bilateral trade between i and j will be lower relative to what it would 
have been with an equal tariff reduction since frictions between all trading partners of i and j 
are controlled for through multilateral resistance.  
In any case, it is clear from the results that there are gains to be made from both tariff and 
NTB reductions. Therefore, if TTIP eliminates tariffs only it can still be called a success. This 
is confirmed by the limited scenarios in both TTIP and CEPR, at least for member countries 
(see table 3.2 and 3.3), although the effects are smaller than in the comprehensive scenarios 
with NTB reductions as well. 
4.5.2 RTA results 
The results in column (i) of table 4.6 have some interesting implications relating to the 
discussion of the effect of trade agreements. First of all, note that the impact of trading with a 
member of a free trade agreement is highly significant and positive. Exports will (on average) 
be about 76 percent higher if exporting to a fellow member of a trade agreement. This 
observation lines up with the standard result in the literature. Head and Mayer (2014) conduct 
a meta-analysis of various policy dummies often used in gravity papers. Based on 257 
independent studies they report an average RTA coefficient of 0.59, albeit with a high 
standard deviation of 0.5. Another meta-analysis is performed by Cipollina and Salvatici 
(2010). They find that the estimated effect ranges from 40 – 65 percent depending on the 
methods used. 
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Secondly, the coefficients on both interaction terms are not significantly different from zero, 
with high p-values at 0.251 and 0.290 for tariffs and NTBs interaction terms respectively. 
Building on the interpretation example from equation (4.3), this gives very little insight as to 
how the RTAs affect the impact of NTBs on trade flows.  
Restricted RTA dummy 
One possibility is that the effects of more efficient trade agreements are diluted by more 
inefficient ones, and therefore the average effect on the interaction term shown in the 
regression in column (i) is uncertain. To check this, I run a separate regression where I restrict 
the RTA dummy to the EU and EEA, NAFTA and ANZCERTA, which I assume to be 
relatively efficient at reducing trade barriers, as discussed above. The result of the regression 
using the restricted RTA dummy is shown in column (ii). Apart from using the restricted RTA 
dummy, the regression is identical to the one in column (i).  
In this case the coefficient on the interaction between RTAs and NTBs is now highly 
significant and negative. This implies that when two countries i and j are fellow members of 
one of the RTAs covered by the restricted RTA dummy, an increase in the NTBs imposed on 
i by j will reduce i’s export to j by more than if i and j were not tied together in one of these 
RTAs. In other words, RTA members are punished relatively more than non-members for 
enforcing NTBs within the agreement. Or, on the other hand, if these trade agreements 
manage to reduce NTB levels further, every percentage decrease will result in a larger 
increase in exports than would be the case outside these agreements. Thus it seems that trade 
agreements not only reduce NTBs, but they increase the effect of reducing them – at least 
within more efficient trade agreements, i.e. the ones covered by the restricted RTA dummy in 
my sample. The same pattern cannot be seen for tariffs; the coefficient on the interaction 
between tariffs and RTAs is still not significantly different from zero in column (ii) (the p-
value has actually increased). 
Another interesting result in column (ii) is that the coefficient on the RTA dummy, while still 
being positive, is much smaller in magnitude compared to the coefficient in column (i). One 
possible explanation for this is that the indirect effect through the multilateral resistance terms 
is stronger in this case. Since only 5 percent of the bilateral relations in the sample are 
covered by these trade agreements (see table 4.2), most countries stand outside. Since the 
gravity model measures the average effect of RTAs on exports, and in this case the average 
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bilateral relation is not a member of the RTAs in question, the result in column (ii) indicates 
that it is more severe for countries to stand outside these trade agreements than the trade 
agreements in column (i). 
Another important result emerging from the results in column (ii) is related to the discussion 
on the two TTIP studies in the previous chapter. The changes in the coefficients when 
restricting the RTA dummy provides the basis for a critique against the IFO study on TTIP. It 
proves that the average effect of trade agreements is dependent on which trade agreements 
that are inherited in the dummy. By assuming that the tariff and NTB reductions will equal 
the average of all existing trade agreements they are losing the ability to make any statements 
regarding effects of different levels of depth in the agreements ability to reduce trade frictions.  
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5 Conclusion 
This thesis set out to discuss how the gravity model is used to account for the presence of 
NTBs in world trade, and how different methods affect the results. This is discussed through 
how the model is employed differently in the studies by CEPR and IFO that try to predict the 
effects of a trade agreement between the EU and US. I have also run my own gravity 
regression using a unique dataset to further supplement the discussion.  
Overall, the thesis confirms that NTBs are a substantial friction to trade. My regressions 
estimate that an average decrease in NTBs of one percent will increase average bilateral trade 
with 2.4 percent, when controlling for multilateral resistance. Furthermore, the data shows 
that the average estimated ad-valorem tariff equivalent of NTBs in the sample is 13.8, which 
is 3.8 percentage points larger than the average observed tariff, and that 37.6 percent of the 
products in the sample is subject to a NTB. Thus, I argue that the success of a transatlantic 
trade agreement – or any trade agreements for that matter – to a large extent will hinge on the 
ability to reduce non-tariff barriers.  
Both CEPR and IFO confirm this statement, and emphasize NTB reductions their studies. 
However, there are significant differences in their findings, particularly regarding the 
magnitude of TTIP’s impact. This can be explained, at least in part, by how they utilize the 
gravity equation to account for NTBs. The CEPR study relies mainly on a business survey on 
transatlantic NTBs, which are calculated into ad-valorem trade cost equivalents using the 
gravity model. These estimates are then used in a CGE model to predict the results. In other 
words, they only use the gravity equation to obtain data on NTBs which then are used in the 
CGE modelling. However, since NTBs plays such an important role in their study, the 
specification of the gravity model still plays a vital role. In the IFO study, the gravity model is 
used more directly. Here, the problem of NTB data shortage is avoided by assuming that the 
effects of TTIP can be calculated from the average effect of existing trade agreements. They 
compare two gravity estimations; one where a simulated TTIP agreement is in place, and one 
where it is not. The simulated TTIP scenario is based on the estimated effects of existing 
RTAs. 
Both methods have their weaknesses. With the CEPR method there are structural issues 
regarding how NTBs are defined in the survey and whether one can trust that the respondents’ 
answers reflect actual NTB levels. IFO avoids this as their average effect will include average 
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NTB reductions in existing trade agreements, as well as average tariff reductions. Therefore, 
they do not need explicit data on NTBs. However, their study is severely limited as their 
method hinders them in being explicit about different scenarios of NTB reductions within 
TTIP. 
The two TTIP studies demonstrate how the gravity model can be used in very different ways 
to account for the presence of NTBs. It is my opinion that the CEPR method of using 
estimated ad-valorem trade cost equivalents is superior, at least for the purpose of predicting 
the outcome of a transatlantic trade agreement, as it allows for flexibility in terms of NTB 
reduction.  
To further discuss the presence of NTBs and to provide an alternative to the CEPR and IFO 
studies, I have constructed an independent dataset and run a separate regression. I base the 
data upon the dataset compiled by Kee et al (2009) who have made a comprehensive dataset 
with estimations of ad-valorem tariff equivalents of NTBs. The data confirm many of the 
points made by both IFO and CEPR; transatlantic NTBs are high, and consistently larger than 
tariffs in nearly all sectors. Furthermore, there are significant gains to be made from reducing 
NTBs, and I find that this effect increases within efficient trade agreements, i.e. the ones 
covered by the restricted RTA dummy in my sample. My regressions also show that there still 
are significant gains to be made from reducing tariff barriers. This is also evident from 
looking at the data, which shows that transatlantic as well as worldwide tariffs still are 
present. This means that if TTIP fails at reducing NTBs it can still be called a success, at least 
to some extent, as there are gains to be made from tariff reductions alone. Both CEPR and 
IFO confirm this, although the gains are substantially smaller than in the more ambitious 
scenarios where NTBs are removed as well.  
Further, my regressions show that when using the restricted RTA dummy, where less efficient 
trade agreements are neglected, the results change. This shows that an “average” effect of 
existing trade agreements, as is used by IFO, hinges on which agreements are included in the 
sample. The IFO report is not clear on which trade agreements they include, or why they 
assume that TTIP will be affected according to the average effect of these particular 
agreements.  
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Appendix 
A1 Deriving the CES demand function 
Multiplying through the first order condition (2.8) with     gives 
(A1.1 ) 
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Then, summing over all i's: 
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Then, inserting   from equation (A1.1), cancelling out terms and rearranging yield: 
( A1.3 ) 
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Raise both sides to the power of –  , then multiply by        and  finally rearrange again to 
get: 
( A1.4 ) 
 
(       )
   
 
  
          
[∑   
       
   
      
   ]
   
 
Sum over all i's: 
( A1.5 ) 
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Define the price index of country j as    [∑ (       )
    
   ]
       
: 
( A1.6 ) 
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Inserting this back into (A1.4): 
( A1.7 ) 
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Recall from chapter 2 that the nominal value of exports from i to j is             . Inserting 
(A1.7) into this expression yields the demand for i goods by j consumers: 
( A1.8 ) 
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A2 The Bergstrand, Egger and Larch gravity model 
This specification of the gravity model is based on the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman framework 
(Dixit and Stieglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1979 and 1980). There is a single industry with 
monopolistic competitive market, increasing returns to scale in production and labor as the 
only input factor (MC-IR model). This leads each firm to produce a unique variety of the 
industry good. Consumers are assumed to follow the same CES utility structure as in the 
Anderson and van Wincoop model with the additional assumption that preferences are 
determined by a “love for variety”.  To simplify the derivation it is assumed that all firms 
within each country are symmetrical so that the equilibrium prices are equalized and each 
variety is consumed in equal amounts.   
Consumers 
Let    be the number of varieties of the good produced in i. The utility function of a consumer 
in j is: 
( A2.1 ) 
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Note that compared to equation (2.5) the only difference is that the exogenous preference 
parameter,   
     
, is replaced by the endogenous number of varieties   , i.e. the number of 
firms. Assuming the same structure of trade costs and prices as before, consumers maximize 
(A2.1) subject to the budget constraint: 
( A2.2 ) 
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This yields the demand for each variety: 
(A2.3 ) 
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Where     also replaces     
     
 in the price index from the Anderson and van Wincoop 
model:    [∑   (     )
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.  
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Producers 
The increasing returns to scale element enters the model via the assumed cost function 
( A2.4 ) 
 
          
where    is the labor used by the representative firm in country i (remember, they are all equal 
within countries) and    is the firm’s output.   is the fixed cost and    is the marginal cost. 
Maximization of profits,             , where    is the factor price (the wage) yields the 
following equilibrium conditions (Bergstrand et al. 2013)
24
. 
( A2.5 ) 
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Furthermore, assuming full employment assures that the number of varieties are determined 
by the exogenous factor endowment, i.e. the labor stock,   , which is unique to each country: 
( A2.7 ) 
 
                                 
  
  
 
 
 
The gravity equation 
Following Krugman (1980) and Feenstra (2004) aggregate exports from i to j is given by  
              . Inserting the demand function (A2.3), the equilibrium number of firms 
(A2.6) and the equilibrium price (A2.5), Bergstrand et al. reach the following gravity 
equation: 
(A2.8 ) 
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Equation (A2.8), subject to the same market clearing condition,    ∑     , as in Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) is the alternative structural gravity equation based on a 
unconditional general equilibrium framework.  
                                                 
24
 To save space I do not show the derivation of the consumer or the producer problems. They follow the 
standard derivation of the MC-IR model as in Krugman (1980) and Feenstra (2004). 
68 
 
The empirical fixed effects version of the model 
Log linearizing equation (A2.8) yields 
( A2.9 ) 
 
                               
Where the country fixed effects terms    and    are given as: 
( A2.10 ) 
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and     is a stochastic error term. Note that (A2.9) is the exact same as the fixed effects 
equation (2.17) derived from the Anderson van Wincoop model. The only difference lies in 
the specification of the theoretical model and thus how the multilateral resistance terms are 
specified. 
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A3 Calculating the trade cost term 
Inserting  
  
  
 
  
  
     in (4.8) gives 
( A3.1 ) 
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To keep the presentation from getting to messy, I simplify the trade cost term in (4.9) and 
assume that it consists of distance, tariffs and NTBs only: 
( A3.2 ) 
 
                          
Now, inserting this expression in equation (A3.1): 
( A3.3 ) 
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Then, rearranging terms: 
( A3.4 ) 
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This can be written as 
( A3.5 ) 
 
      
        
       
       
   
where      
 ,     
  and     
  are given by (4.11) – (4.13). Equation (A3.5) is the same as 
(4.10), only including fewer trade costs proxies for illustrative purposes.   
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A4 Taylor approximations of the cultural and 
historical variables used in the estimations 
The cultural and historical dummy variables used in the estimation,       
  
         
  
  
        
        
  
         
 
 and       
  
 , are calculated using equation (4.8). Thus, they are 
defined as follows: 
( A4.1 ) 
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( A4.5 ) 
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( A4.6 ) 
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A5 List of countries in the dataset 
 
  
 
1 Algeria 34 Guatemala 67 Pakistan 
2 Argentina 35 Honduras 68 Papua New Guinea 
3 Australia 36 Hong Kong 69 Paraguay 
4 Austria 37 Hungary 70 Peru 
5 Bahrain 38 Iceland 71 Philippines 
6 Bangladesh 39 India 72 Poland 
7 Belarus 40 Indonesia 73 Portugal 
8 Belguim 41 Ireland 74 Republic of Moldova 
9 Bolivia 42 Italy 75 Romania 
10 Brazil 43 Ivory Coast 76 Russian Federation 
11 Brunei 44 Japan 77 Rwanda 
12 Burkina Faso 45 Jordan 78 Saudi Arabia 
13 Butan 46 Kazakstan 79 Senegal 
14 Cameroon 47 Kenya 80 Slovenia 
15 Canada 48 Kygyzstan 81 South Africa 
16 Central African Republic 49 Latvia 82 Spain 
17 Chech Republic 50 Lebanon 83 Sri Lanka 
18 Chile 51 Lithuania 84 Sudan 
19 China 52 Madagascar 85 Sweden 
20 Colombia 53 Malawi 86 Switzerland 
21 Costa Rica 54 Malaysia 87 Tanzania 
22 Country 55 Mali 88 Thailand 
23 Denmark 56 Mauritsius 89 Trinidad And Tobago 
24 Ecuador 57 Mexico 90 Tunisia 
25 EL Salvador 58 Morcocco 91 Turkey 
26 Estonia 59 Mozambique 92 Uganda 
27 Ethiopia 60 Nepal 93 Ukraine 
28 Finland 61 Netherlands 94 United Kingdom 
29 France 62 New Zealand 95 Uruguay 
30 Gabon 63 Nicaragua 96 USA 
31 Germany 64 Nigeria 97 Venezuela 
32 Ghana 65 Norway 98 Vietnam 
33 Greece 66 Oman 99 Zambia 
    100 Zimbabwe 
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